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I.

MARKET INFORMATION AND

A.

RULE lOb-5

Market Information

A company discovers that land it owns contains substantial mineral
deposits which can be commercially exploited. Officers and directors of
the company who are aware of this discovery purchase the company's
stock in the market before the information is made public. These facts
describe a by now familiar inside information situation When the
information is made public, the market will know that the value of the
company's assets and its earning power have been substantially augmented and the price of the stock will adjust to reflect the increase in
the value of the company. Purchase of the stock by directors and officers
of the company under these circumstances violates the antifraud provisions of rule 10b-5 2 promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.1
The following facts describe another situation in which material,
non-public information is present. The president of ABC Company
learns from Giant Brokerage Firm's analyst, who interviews him about
* This Article bears a date of February 26, 1973. Some citations have been updated
editorially.
t BA. 1953, LL.B. 1958, Yale University. Member, New York Bar.
ttFred Carr Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Director, University of
Pennsylvania Law School Center for Study of Financial Institutions. BA. 1954, LL.B.
1957, Harvard University. Member, New York Bar.
itfA.B. 1967, Georgetown University; J.D. 1971, University of Pennsylvania.
Member, California Bar. The major part of my contribution to this Article was prepared
while I was a Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Center for Study of
Financial Institutions.
'See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'g and aF'g
in part 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). An early
Massachusetts case contains striking parallels to the facts in Texas Gulf Sulphur. Goodwin
v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
2SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969). The court in Goodwin v. Agassiz affirmed a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
under Massachusetts law where defendant's purchases were made on the Boston Stock
Exchange and plaintiff did not show reliance on defendant's failure to disclose the
information he had concerning the existence of copper deposits on the company's land.
8 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act], Rule 10b-4, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1972).
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ABC, that Giant Brokerage will shortly publish a favorable analysis of
ABC, including a recommendation to buy the stock. That report is based
on generally available facts. ABC stock is thinly traded so that the appearance of the Giant Brokerage report and recommendation is "reasonably certain" to have a substantial impact on the price of ABC stock.
Can the president of ABC buy stock of the company prior to the appearance of the Giant Brokerage report and recommendation without violating rule 10b-5?
In this example nothing happens to the company which has any
impact on the value of its assets or its earning power. Nevertheless,
any person buying ABC stock who possesses information about the
Giant Brokerage report and recommendation will have an advantage
over sellers of the stock who are unaware of the information. Measured
by the immediate impact on stock price alone, the two events may be
of equal significance.
The second situation typifies those cases where the undisclosed
information is market information. For our purposes, market information refers to information about events or circumstances which affect
the market for a company's securities but which do not affect the company's assets or earning power. Situations involving market information
abound. Knowledge that mutual funds experienced net redemptions
over a recent period has affected market prices generally. In other cases
market information affects only the stock of a particular company.
Certain persons may know that a tender offer for Target Company will
shortly be made at a premium over the present market price. Certain
persons may know that they or others intend to purchase or sell a
sufficiently large number of shares of ABC Company to affect substantially the present market price of the stock.4 Certain persons may know
that ABC Company will shortly split its stock. 5
4
See Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314, 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1959) (insider failed
to disclose that a wealthy individual was interested in purchasing shares, where those
purchases caused an increase in price of the stock). Such information also would be
important where the purchases remove a block of stock overhanging the market and
depressing the price of the security, see, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 264
(1st Cir. 1966); Matarese v. Aero-Chatillon Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 93,322 at 91,731 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
5
See, e.g., Hausman, West & Largay, Stock Splits, Price Changes, and Trading
Profits: A Synthesis, 44 J. Bus. 69 (1971); Kimball & Papera, Effect of Stock Splits on
Short-Term Market Prices, 20 Fro. ANAL. J. 75 (1964); Rieke, Selling on the News, 44
BAmboN's, Nov. 30, 1964, at 9. If the stock split is not accompanied by a proportionate
reduction in the dividend per share, the effect of the split would be to increase the
dividend payment. Increases in dividends normally result in an increase in the stock
price. Even a stock split which does not carry with it a rise in the dividend rate may
have a similar effect. The reduction in the price of the stock, together with the greater
number of shares outstanding, frequently attracts greater purchasing power, thus causing
the price of the stock to rise. Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1972, at 1, col. 6 (east coast ed.).
In Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 345 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965), a corporation's
failure to disclose an impending 4% stock dividend to a shareholder from whom it repur-
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In the last few years, there has been increasing regulatory emphasis
on the importance of adequate disclosure of market information. Recently adopted rule 144, which governs the resale of "restricted" securities, conditions its applicability on the seller filing a Form 144 with
the SEC at the time of placing the sell order.8 Form 144 asks for information about the seller's intention to sell, the amount of securities to
be sold, the market place in which the securities will be sold and the
name of the selling broker. Since the Form is a public document,
market makers and others are provided access to information about the
available supply of and potential selling pressure on the particular
security.7 In addition, the SEC has begun requiring disclosure, at least
in the case of initial public offerings, of the amount of stock of a company that could be resold without registration under the 1933 Act
after the effective date of the registration statement.8 Presumably the
chased shares was held not to be a violation of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The district court
based its conclusion on the fact that stock dividends have no intrinsic value and give
the shareholder no greater ownership interest in the corporation. The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding on the facts of the case, but indicated that in some
circumstances knowledge of a stock dividend might be material information. Id. at 168.
The Hafner decision has been cited as recognizing the potential market importance of
stock dividends and stock splits. 1 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRITIs LAw-FRAu: SEC RULE
10b-5, § 7.4(4) (b), at 170.1 n.123 (1969). Cf. Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616, 618
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
BSEC Securities Act Rule 144(h), 37 Fed. Reg. 591, 596 (1972). Proposed rule 144(h)
required that the seller file a notice of intention to sell at least ten days in advance of any
sale. That provision was designed to produce market information. For an analysis of the
adverse impact on the seller of having to supply such information, see Matteson, Dispositions of Securities Under Proposed Rule 144, in PLI 3D ANNUAL INSITUTE oN SECUMES
REGuL.AmON 35, 50 (R. Mundheim & A. Fleischer eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as 3D
ANNuAL INsTiTuTE].

"7
The SEC requires that a stockholder selling securities pursuant to a registration
statement under the Securities Act of 1933 furnish his identity and the amount of stock
proposed to be sold. See, e.g., Form S-l, Item 19, Instruction 3, 1 CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 1 8210. Under the American Law Institutes tentative draft of the Federal Securities Code, similar market information would in effect be required of all sellers of securities, whether or not control persons and whether or not selling "restricted" securities, if
their sales are effected by means of a "distribution" (a non-trading transaction). ALI
FED. SECURTIES CODE §§ 227, 509 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1971).
8 For example, the prospectus of Strother Drug Company, dated November 28, 1972,
stated on the cover page:
Additional outstanding shares available for public sale-Holders of 101,916
shares of the Company's outstanding shares of common stock not included in this
offering are free to sell their stock without limitation on the open market at the
present time. Holders of 236,820 shares who would otherwise be free to sell their
stock without limitation on the open market have agreed not to sell any shares
for a period of 90 days following the date of this prospectus and holders of all
of these shares have advised the Company that they have no present intention
of disposing of their shares during the twelve-month period following the date of
this prospectus. Holders of an additional 241,264 shares who have also agreed
not to sell their shares for a period of 90 days following the date of this prospectus will be free to sell their shares subject to regulatory limitations on the
amounts that may be sold and the methods of sale following such 90-day period.
Holders of these shares have advised the Company that depending upon personal
circumstances and the state of the market, it is possible that sales might be made
within the twelve-month period following the date of this prospectus. Under
existing regulations such persons could sell up to 31,200 shares during such
period. Sales by existing stockholders could have a significant impact upon any
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intended purpose of this disclosure is to make investors aware of the
fact that stockholders of the registrant, who have been essentially
locked in while the company was privately held, are now free to resell
and, in so doing, may adversely affect the market price of the stock.
In addition, the information disclosed may furnish some idea of the
prospective "float" for the company's securities. Further, the SEC's
proposals relating to hot issues include a requirement that preliminary
prospectuses and final prospectuses of certain issues disclose an estimate
of the approximate percentage of an offering which will be placed with
the principal underwriter's discretionary accounts.9 This requirement is
designed to give investors in these issues material information about
the supply of securities actually available to the public.'0 The SEC has
also sought to secure disclosure about the nature of the market in a
company's securities, at least when known facts indicate the absence of
an established trading market."
In addition to requiring affirmative disclosure of market information in certain circumstances, the SEC has been investigating trading
by brokers and their customers on the basis of knowledge that a research report or newspaper article would shortly be published.'2 Moreover, the SEC is seeking an injunction in a situation involving a pattern
of stock purchases by a financial columnist prior to the publication of
his column recommending purchase of these stocks.' 3 The chief trial
trading market which might develop subsequent to this offering. The expressions
of intent described above were obtained orally, are not legally enforceable and
are subject to change at any moment. See "Selling Stockholders--Outstanding
Shares Available for Public Sale."
In Birdman v. Electro-Catheter Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. II 93,934
(E.D. Pa., Jan. 18, 1973), the district court held, in denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment, that a company violated rule 10b-5 and § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77k (1970), in failing to disclose the potential market impact of the contemplated sale of restricted securities shortly after a public offering by the issuer. The
registration statement allegedly failed to disclose that two shareholders intended to sell
their shares of the issuer's common stock, after the public offering by the issuer. The
shares intended to be sold amounted to more than 25% of the issuer's offering.
9 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5276 (July 26, 1972).
10 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5274 (July 26, 1972).
11 Guideline 13, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (July 26, 1961). See also Guideline 45, requiring supplemental information as to the over-the-counter market for securities to be registered, including the aggregate number of shares transferred on the records
of the registrant during a recent six-month period and the names of the most active
market makers during that period. For suggestions by then Commissioner Richard B.
Smith that the forms of the SEC, under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, should contain
further disclosures relating to information about the market for a company's securities,
see Speech before the General Practice Conference on Securities Regulation of the Philadelphia Bar Association and the Pennsylvania Bar Institute, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
December 9, 1967.
12
See Greer, Cases on Tips Smudge Street's Image Further, Washington Post, Dec.
18, 1972, § D at 11, col. 1. A fuller description of the SEC's concern with the unfair
use of market information appears in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9950, at 114-29
(Jan. 16, 1973).
' 3 See SEC v. Campbell, Civ. No. 72-1684-WID (C.D. Cal., July 24, 1972); notes
110-26 infra & accompanying text.
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counsel of the New York Regional Office of the SEC summarized SEC
activity in this area by stating:
From all this one might conclude that notwithstanding its
historical development thus far the application of Section 10
(b) to the unfair use of material, non-public information
should not be restricted to information which emanates from
a corporate source nor need it necessarily deal with a corporate issuer or its affairs. It should apply with equal force to the
use of any information in the securities marketplace which
either should be or is about to be made public, as long as the
publication of the information might affect the decision of a
reasonable investor.1 4
B.

Scope of Rule 10b-5

Rule 10b-5 prohibits any person, whether or not he is what has
been called an insider, from telling a material lie or half-truth in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.' 15 It is not necessary
that the lie or half-truth be about the company."8 For example, the
SEC has taken the position that a broker who knows of an impending
tender offer at above current market prices cannot advise his customers
to sell into the market.' 7 A fortiori it would be a violation of rule 10b-5
for any person to induce the purchase of a company's securities by
falsely representing that a large mutual fund will begin a major acquisition program of the company's securities on the following day.' 8
More difficult questions arise in cases where a person buying or
14 Peloso, SEC Rule 1ob-5 and Outside Information, 168 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1972,
at 32, 34.
15 Rule 10b-5(2) states that it shall be unlawful for any person
to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading... in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(2) (1972).
30 See, e.g., Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Fleischer, Securities
Trading and Corporate Information Practices; The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. Rxv. 1271, 1285 (1965).
17
Brief of SEC, Pacific Ins. Co. v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); M.S.
Wien & Co., 23 S.E.C. 735, 746-54 (1946) (dictum) (tender offer impending at price
substantially above market). See also Indiana State Sec. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 118 (1957)
(dealer sold stock by means of a prospectus showing offering price to be $6, without
disclosing the stock was trading in the market at 3-3/ bid, 4-Y2 asked).
18This fact pattern is almost the converse of that presented by one of the early
lob-5 cases. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), two
of the four shareholders of a small Michigan paper company arranged to sell the assets
of the company and an affiliate to National Gypsum. After the contract had been signed,
these two shareholders purchased the 50% interest of the other shareholders at a price
substantially below one-half of the sale price negotiated with National Gypsum. The
court found that the two shareholders had lied when asked whether they had made any
agreement for the sale of the stock or the assets, and ordered the purchasing shareholders
to account for the profits realized by them. Cf. Courtland v. Walston & Co., Inc., [19711972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1193,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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selling securities fails to disclose material, non-public information which
he possesses. The problem in the silence cases is to identify the circumstances which trigger a duty to come forward with information. In the
rule 10b-5 context the concept of materiality appears to be applied
more restrictively in imposing liability for failure to fulfill an affirmative
obligation to disclose than in imposing liability with respect to a misstatement or half-truth. 9
1. Materiality
A responsibility to come forward with information has typically
been imposed only when the undisclosed event has a significant and
long-term impact on the company. However, market information frequently relates to an event which has only passing effect. It could be
argued that, unlike information about the company which would be
important in protecting long-term investors, market information is
primarily relevant to short-term traders. If the federal securities laws'
concern for the protection of the investor relates primarily to long-term
investors, 20 courts should be more reluctant to impose duties of affirmative disclosure in connection with market information than they are
with respect to information about the company.
It is unlikely, however, that courts will give much weight to this
distinction between market information and information about the
company. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf
Sulphur firmly rejected the notion that the federal securities laws seek
to protect only the long-term or conservative investor. In reviewing the
district court's test of materiality, the circuit court reminded the district
court that:
The speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are also
"reasonable" investors entitled to the same legal protection
afforded conservative traders 2 1
Even if the federal securities laws accorded different degrees of protection to long-term investors and short-term traders, it is hard, in any
19 This conclusion is reflected in the American Law Institutes tentative draft of the
Federal Securities Code. Compare ALI FED. SacuRn7Es CODE § 256 (Tent. Draft No. 2,

1973)2 with id.§§ 1303(a), (c).

oHenry Manne's defense of insider trading isbased inpart on his view that longterm investors should be the primary objects of SEC solicitude. See H. ANNE, INsmER
TRAING Am = STocK_ MAaExr (1966); Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, HARV.
Bus. R v., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 113, 114.
21 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969) (footnote omitted). See Investors Diversified Services, Inc.'s Statement of
Policy With Respect to Receipt and Use of Material Inside (Non-Public) Information,
appended to SEC v. Lum's Inc., No. 70-5280 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1972) (information is
material if its dissemination "is likely to affect the market price of any of the company's
securities . . .or is likely to be considered important by reasonable investors, including
reasonable speculative investors, in determining whether to trade in such securities"),
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given case, to determine whether the investors who have been harmed
are short-term or long-term investors.2 2 Further, in many cases, market
information has more than a short-term effect. For example, when a
company becomes recognized by an influential brokerage house, the
market for the stock may achieve a long-term improvement in price.
Nevertheless, courts should be cautious in finding that any particular item of market information is material, because many factors determine market price at any particular time. Knowledge that Conglomerate
Company intends within the week to make a tender offer for Target
Company's stock at a 20% premium over present market price may be
sufficiently certain (in terms of probability of occurrence and impact
on price) to be considered material. On the other hand, the effect of
Giant Brokerage Firm's report and recommendation on the market price
of ABC stock will often be much less certain. The effect will depend
in large part on the depth of the market in ABC stock and on market
conditions in general. If the recommendation appears along with Giant
Brokerage Firm recommendations of a number of stocks, the force of
the ABC recommendation may be diluted. In addition, investor reactions to any particular recommendation are hard to predict. Other
brokerage firms may be taking a negative view of ABC stock--or such
a strongly favorable view on XYZ stock that customers who hold ABC
stock would be induced to sell it to raise funds for investment in XYZ.
2. Special Relationship
The duty to disclose material, non-public information has not been
imposed on every person possessing this type of information. Traditionally, this obligation has been limited to persons with a special relationship to the company affected by the information. Restrictions on the
securities trading of this class of persons reflect notions of fiduciary
responsibility developed under state and federal law. Cady, Roberts,
one of the landmark cases on insider trading, spells out this approach.
It reasoned:
Analytically, the obligation [to disclose material, non-public
information prior to trading] rests on two principal elements;
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
22

See Schotland, Unsafe At Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 VA. L. Pv. 1425, 1447-48 (1967).
28The relationship between common law doctrines of fiduciary responsibility and
the development of the law under rule 10b-5 is summarized in 3 L. Loss, S.cuRrf=
REOurATION 1445-53 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id. 3557-72 (1969).
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takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing.24
The Cady, Roberts analysis of the reason for implying a duty to
disclose has served as a model for judicial and administrative opinions
and legal commentary for more than a decade. In its en banc decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit described the Cady, Roberts analysis as the "essence" of rule
10b-5.25 Based upon traditional analysis, and assuming that the information was material, the president of ABC who learns, because
of his position with ABC, that Giant Brokerage will shortly publish
a favorable report on ABC probably would be precluded from buying ABC stock until a reasonable time after the report was published 6
The hypothetical would have been more difficult if Giant Brokerage Firm had communicated to Mutual Fund its intent shortly to
publish a favorable analysis of ABC, including a recommendation to
buy. Although Mutual Fund, just like the president of ABC, possesses
material, non-public information, Mutual Fund did not acquire it as
a consequence of a relationship to ABC which gave it access to the
information2
Recent attempts to define the circumstances which trigger a duty
to disclose suggest that the relationship test of Cady, Roberts may
be too restrictive. In a case decided shortly after Texas Gulf Sulphur,
SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc.,2 8 three judges in the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit indicated that they would be willing
to extend the duty of affirmative disclosure imposed by rule 10b-5
beyond the area encompassed by traditional notions of fiduciary responsibility. Great American Industries involved an action by the
SEC for an injunction against persons who sold mining properties to
Great American in exchange for its shares. The Commission charged
that the sellers violated rule 10b-5 because they failed to disclose a
material fact by not telling the buyer that a substantial part of the
price paid would be allocated to finders. The majority of the Second
Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the facts went considerably beyond
24 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted).
25 401 F.2d at 848.
26
The New York Stock Exchange has disciplined a member of a brokerage firm who,
upon hearing from the president of a company that it planned to make a tender offer
for its own stock substantially above the market, acquired stock for his wife before the
news was made public. SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITES MARxETS, H.R. Doc. No.
95, 88th Cong., 1st Seas., pt. 1, at 435 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY].
27 The problems raised by Giant Brokerage Firm's communication of its intent to
publish a favorable analysis of ABC are discussed in detail in notes 127-38 infra & accompanying text.

28407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
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non-disclosure and, therefore, did not think it necessary to determine
whether or not a seller might have an affirmative duty of disclosure
on the facts presented in that case.
It must be conceded that imposing on sellers of property or
finders a duty of full disclosure to a buyer issuing securities
in exchange, with a consequent duty on the part of the latter
to publicize material facts so disclosed, would increase the
protection afforded investors and traders by the securities
laws. On the other hand, to read Rule 10b-5 as placing an
affirmative duty of disclosure on persons who in contrast to
"insiders" or broker-dealers did not occupy a special relationship to a seller or buyer of securities, would be occupying
new ground and would require most careful consideration.2 9
Of the three judges prepared to occupy this "new ground," Judge
Kaufman seemed willing to go the furthest. He concluded that, at
least for the purpose of granting injunctive relief,
any claim that material facts were withheld in a transaction
in connection with the sale or purchase of securities must be
scrutinized with care, whether or not there would have been
liability at common law for such a deed. 0
The Kaufman opinion comes close to suggesting that it is inherently
unfair for one party to trade with another whom he knows or should
know does not possess certain material information.
Although no case has held that there must be parity of material information between the parties to a securities transaction, there is
evidence of an SEC disposition to push the law more forcefully in
that direction. In Investors Management Co.,31 the SEC had its first
opportunity to consider whether tippees are subject to prohibitions
on trading where they receive material, non-public information about
a company. The SEC determined that the prohibitions apply if the
tippees "know or have reason to know that [the information] was
nonpublic and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation
or otherwise."32 This test could be read as prohibiting tippee trading
if the tippee knew or had reason to know that the information had
been communicated to a small group, regardless of the source of the
information. Although a later portion of the opinion states that the information must "[emanate] from a corporate source, ''a the looseness
29 Id. at 460.
sod. at 463.
31 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971), in [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,163.
3
2 1d. 80,519.
33 Id. 80,520.

19731
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of the test stated earlier prompted a special concurrence by Commissioner Smith. He emphasized his belief that the prohibitions of rule
10b-5 "should continue to be on the conduct of corporate insiders
and their privies ... rather than upon a concept . . . of relative informational advantages in the market place. 3 4 Commissioner Smith
would have rephrased the majority's test
in terms of the respondents knowing or having reason to know
that the material, non-public information became available to
them in breach of a duty owed to the corporation not to disclose or use the information for non-corporate purposes 5
The SEC's recent attempts to use rule 10b-5 to control trading
on material non-public market information sharply focus the question
whether rule 10b-5 triggers a duty of disclosure in the absence of
an "insider" relationship to the corporation whose securities are affected by the information. Market information is frequently "outside" information-it is generated by sources outside the company
whose shares are affected.3 6 The favorable Giant Brokerage Firm
analysis and recommendation is one example of outside information.
The specialist in ABC stock receives material, non-public information
about the flow of trading in the stock from non-company sources.
Brokers acquire material, non-public market information in the course
34

Id. 80,523.
35Id. 80,523-24 (footnote omitted). Under Commissioner Smith's test the tippee
participates in his tippor's breach of duty when he acts on the information received.
Commissioner Smith suggested that this analysis may explain the phrase "improperly
obtained" in the majority's test.
In the policy statement adopted by Investors Diversified Services, Inc., supra note
21, in conjunction with the entry of a consent injunction against it, "inside" information
is defined as "information that has not been publicly disclosed." Application of that test
would impose an equality of information standard. However, the policy statement later
limits restrictions on trading to cases where "an IDS employee receives material information about a company which he knows or has reason to believe is directly or indirectly
attributable to such company (or its insiders)." Id. at 3.
The opinion in Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1972), demonstrates the extent to which a court felt
it necessary to find an insider relationship in order to impose a duty to disclose material,
non-public information. That case involved competing tender offers for Westinghouse
Air Brake by Crane and American Standard. American Standard was a friendly suitor
which made its offer following overtures from the management of Air Brake. The Second
Circuit concluded that "Standard was an 'insider' with respect to the trading of Air
Brake stock." Id. at 796. In support of its conclusion, the court noted that Standard and
Air Brake were acting in concert, that Standard informed Air Brake management of
Standard's purchases of Air Brake stock, and that Standard was a major stockholder of
Air Brake with particular knowledge about its own market purchases. Yet Standard did
not receive information as a result of its relationship with Air Brake. Instead, the information relied upon to make Standard an insider was generated by Standard and flowed
from Standard to Air Brake. See SEC v. Shapiro, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
ff 93,623 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (financial consultant concedes that he is insider with respect
to merger he seeks to promote).
36
It is possible, although unusual, for corporate information to be generated outside
the company whose securities are affected. See 3D ANNuAL InsTrrUmE, supra note 6, at
394-97 (discussion of Messrs. Leech, Fleischer, Loomis, Ruder and Mundheim).
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of executing transactions for customers or serving as an outsider's
dealer-manager in a tender offer for Target Company stock. Outside
information, like inside information, can give one group of market
participants an advantage over other participants to whom the information is not available.
The SEC has signaled its growing belief that information disparities, and particularly disparities in market information, must be
reduced. In its recent 19b-2 release the SEC stressed its consistent
emphasis on "the removal or limitation of the special trading advantage which any one group or classification of investors holds over
another. ' ' 7 The release then detailed a number of situations in which
market information could be used "by professionals to gain a trading
advantage over public investors."38
The disclosure requirements of rule 10b-5 are an obvious source
of power for implementing the theme of "trading fairness" highlighted
in the release. Thus, the Chief Counsel of the New York Regional
Office of the SEC has concluded that rule 10b-5 prohibits
the use of any information in the securities marketplace which
either should be or is about to be made public, as long as the
publication of the information might affect the decision of a
reasonable investor.39
His view of trading fairness would require placing all buyers and sellers
in the market on a parity with respect to the availability of material
information. His view of rule 10b-5 would add a new dimension to
its role in regulating conduct in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities."
The next few years will determine the direction of rule 10b-5's
development. The SEC has announced that it is preparing guidelines
on the responsibilities and obligations imposed by the rule, including
its application to market information. 4 ' Further, courts will be required to consider the applicability of rule 10b-5 to market information. The primary purpose of this article is to make an initial inquiry
into the extent to which the rule can appropriately serve as a medium
for regulating trading conduct. This inquiry is conducted by analyzing a number of situations in which a purchaser or seller possesses
material non-public market information. We conclude that there are
substantial limitations in using the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws to achieve trading fairness.
37
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9950, at 109 (Jan. 16, 1973).
3
81d. 114-15.

89
40 Peloso, supra note 14, at 34.
See notes 67-72 infra & accompanying
41

text.
See N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1973, at 37, col. 4-6.
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At the same time we recognize that rule 10b-5 is not the only
basis on which the SEC and the self-regulatory authorities can implement the regulatory goal of trading fairness. For example, our
discussion of the regulation of market professionals who occupy key
roles in the functioning of the market stresses the complex body of
rules designed to ensure fair dealing. These rules, however, are designed to meet broad statutorily-imposed criteria of maintaining "honest and fair markets,14 and are not primarily based on the antifraud
provisions. Moreover, the SEC can use its power to prescribe the
contents of periodic reports and documents such as the registration
statement to compel the disclosure of important market information.

II.

DISCLOSURE IN

THE CONTEXT OF A CORPORATE

ACQUISITION PLAN

Definition of the circumstances requiring affirmative disclosure
of material, non-public market information can be approached by examining the duties of various persons who know that a tender offer
will shortly be made for a particular stock at a premium over present market price. Assume that Conglomerate Company intends to
acquire 51% of the common stock of Target Company, listed on the
New York Stock Exchange, by making a cash tender offer at $25
per share, $5 above the current market price. Conglomerate presently owns no Target stock and its officers and directors have had
no contact with officers or directors of Target. Conglomerate would
like to purchase up to 5% of the outstanding shares of Target stock
in the market before announcing its tender offer and making the disclosures required by the Williams Act. 3 The first question relates
42

See notes 173-75 infra & accompanying text.
43 1934 Act § 13(d) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1), and rule 13d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1
(1972), require any person who has acquired more than 5% of the stock of a company
registered under § 12 of the Act to file a statement with the SEC, the issuer and the
exchange on which the stock is listed containing the same type of information required to
be furnished by the maker of a tender offer.
Conglomerate's intention to make a tender offer shortly after it has completed its
market purchases has been held not to make those purchases part of the tender offer as the
term is used in § 14(d) (1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1) (1970), and thus
does not trigger that section's disclosure requirements. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 93,765 at 93,335,
93,336 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 13, 1973), aff'd, No. 73-1223 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 1973). See Wander,
Takeovers: Preparing the Attack, in 2D ANNUAL INSTITuTE ON SECUcMEs REGULATION
237, 240 (R. Mundheim & A. Fleischer eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as 2D ANNUAL
IxsTrruTE].
Two former staff members of the SEC then charged with interpreting the Williams
Bill have contended that market purchases mark the beginning of a "tender offer" under
§ 14(d) of the Exchange Act where the person making the purchases has announced
his intention to acquire shares of the issuer in an amount that would result in ownership
of more than five percent. See Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439-
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to Conglomerate's ability to make market purchases without disclosing its plan to make a tender offer at a higher price.
If generally known, Conglomerate's intention to make a tender
offer at a 25% premium over the current NYSE price would be reasonably certain, in terms of probability of occurrence and impact on
price, to cause a substantial rise in the price of Target Company
stock. Knowledge of the impending tender offer certainly would "affect the desire of [Target shareholders and potential purchasers] to
buy, sell, or hold the company's securities,"44 particularly with regard
to the timing of purchases or sales of Target stock. Thus, the information is material and non-public.45
Nevertheless, it seems clear that under these circumstances Conglomerate has no obligation under rule 10b-5 (or its Williams Act
analogue, section 14(e)) to disclose its plans before making market
purchases. 46 A reason for restricting management trading under rule
Growing Pains? 16 How. L.J. 654, 700-01 (1971). The staff of the SEC has also taken
the position that, where a company acquired shares of the target through market purchases and through direct solicitation of shareholders for the purpose of acquiring control
of the target, these "offers to purchase in the aggregate" constituted a tender offer. See
Cattlemen's Investment Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RP.
ff 78,775 (Jan. 4, 1972) (interpretative letter).
44 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
45 Although knowledge of the tender offer is market information, knowledge of the
potential shift in control of Target Company would be important to an evaluation of
the investment worth of Target Company and might thus properly be characterized as
corporate information. In addition, if Target Company's assets or earnings are material
relative to Conglomerate, information concerning the contemplated takeover would be
material corporate information about Conglomerate. See SEC v. Glen Alden Corp., [19671969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RP. 192,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
40 General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Jacobsen Mfg. Co. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 282 F. Supp. 598
(E.D. Wis. 1968); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (dictum);
Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955); A. BROMERG, supra note 5,
§ 6.3, at 122.5; Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 317, 328-35 (1967); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARv. L. REv. 377, 389
(1969).
The SEC releases accompanying rule 10b-13 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 offer some support for the view that the Commission does not believe rule 10b-S is
automatically violated if Conglomerate acquires shares in the open market before making
a tender offer. Rule 10b-13 prohibits a person making a tender offer from purchasing
securities of the same class other than through the offer during the period of the offer.
In the release initially proposing the present form of rule 10b-13, the Commission stated:
Actual purchases made prior to the inception of that period are not specifically
prohibited under the proposed rule, although disclosure of such purchases within
a specific prior period is required to be filed in schedules filed under Sections
13(d) and 14(d) of the Act. Such pre-tender purchases, of course, would be subject to the provisions of Rule 10b-5 under the Act.
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8595 (May 5, 1969). In the release adopting rule lOb-13
this language was changed as follows:
Purchases made prior to the inception of that period are not specifically prohibited under the rule, although disclosure of such purchases within a specific
prior period is required to be filed in schedules filed under Sections 13(d) and
14(d) of the Act. Of course, the general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions could apply to such pre-tender purchases.
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8712 (Oct. 8, 1969).
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10b-5 is to remove any personal interest which management might
have in delaying the disclosure of corporate news.4 7 Because Conglomerate is not part of Target management, its purchases of Target
stock will not trigger a duty of disclosure on this theory.
A broader basis for restricting securities trading by persons in
possession of material undisclosed information is built upon fiduciary
responsibility concepts as developed under both state and federal
law.48 The duty of disclosure seeks to prevent corporate insiders from
using information received by virtue of their corporate position to
take advantage of investors who are unaware of the information.
Conglomerate has no duty of disclosure under this theory because
its intention to make a tender offer for Target shares was not obtained through any relationship giving access to Target Company and
because it has no fiduciary relationship to Target shareholders which
would require disclosure of its plans. Moreover, it would be peculiarly
inappropriate to extend rule 10b-5 to require Conglomerate to disclose its plans to selling Target shareholders. In our case, all relevant
facts about Target are public information equally available to Target
stockholders. Conglomerate's willingness to make a tender offer at a
premium over the market price of Target stock presumably represents its conclusion that Target stock is worth (or potentially is
worth) more than the tender offer price. Requiring Conglomerate to
disclose its intent to make a tender offer would cause the market
price of Target stock to rise, thereby foreclosing its program of market purchases and, in some instances, making the cost of acquiring
the necessary shares so great that the tender offer could not be effected. Forcing disclosure under these circumstances might result in
the nonoccurrence of the event disclosed, thus depriving Conglomerate
of the opportunity to benefit from its superior securities analysis.
If Conglomerate can buy Target stock without disclosing its forthcoming tender offer, can it inform three pension funds about its
planned tender offer and urge the funds to establish a position in the
stock at the present lower market price? This practice-known as
"warehousing"7--was considered by the SEC's Institutional Investor
Study49 in the context of institutional involvement in transfers of
corporate control. On the basis of detailed examination of case studies
47 See Mundheim, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Complaint: A Major Step in Restricting
Insider Trading in Corporate Securities, 1966 J. Bus. L. 284, 287-89.
48 See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
49
SEC, INSTrrUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as IsrrTrIoNAL INVESTOR STuDY]. Professor Mundhelm served as a consultant to Chapter XV of the Study, parts of which are cited later

in this article.
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of transfer situations, the Study found that acquiring companies frequently gave institutions advance notice, in either general or specific
terms, of proposed acquisitions." The Study suggested several reasons for this practice. One purpose of prior disclosure was to develop
institutional interest in the acquiring company's stock in order to
support the market price of that stock during the period of the offer."
Equally important, however, was the desire of acquiring companies
to obtain financing for the tender offer, either by means of a private
placement of the acquiring company's securities with the institutions
or by encouraging the institutions to establish a position in the target
company's stock, with the expectation that the shares purchased would
be tendered when the offer was announced.5 2 Another purpose of
giving the pension funds early warning of the tender offer might be
to make them sympathetic to future calls for help by Conglomerate.
The Study concluded that, to the extent institutional investors
had been given non-public information about future acquisitions or
non-public earnings projections based on such acquisitions which were
material to an evaluation of the acquiring company's stock, institutions might have violated rule 10b-5 by purchasing the acquiring
company's securities without disclosure of that information. s This
conclusion seems correct under traditional rule 10b-5 analysis because
the information was received as the result of a relationship giving
access to the acquiring company and gave institutions an unfair advantage over persons selling the acquiring company's stock. Conspicuously absent from the Study, however, is any suggestion that
institutional purchases of target company stock, based on non-public
information received from the acquiring company regarding its planned
tender offer, might constitute a violation of rule 10b-5.54 Such pur505 id. 2773, 2828-29, 2832-33.
515 id. 2828-29, 2847.
52
Even though warehousing may be viewed as a form of "financing," this does not
necessarily mean that it is an extension of credit and thus subject to the restrictions of
the margin requirements. See id. 2836; Lewyn, Financing Takeovers, in 2D ANmuAL INsn-rUT, supra note 43, at 258, 264-65.
53 5 INsnTruTioNAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 49, at 2830. See SEC v. Glen Alden
Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 92,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

54
The Study concluded that warehousing should be dealt with by new rules rather
than under rule 10b-5. [Summary Volume] INSTUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note
49, at XXXI-XXXIII.
The SEC has rulemaking authority to define and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent practices in connection with tender offers. 1934 Act § 14(e),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). In the hearings preceding the adoption of the amendment
to § 14(e) granting this rulemaking power, the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance
listed, as one of the areas to be covered by rulemaking, the situation in which a "person
who has become aware that a tender bid is to be made, or has reason to believe that
such bid will be made, may fail to disclose material facts with respect thereto to persons
who sell to him securities for which the tender bid is to be made." Hearings on S. 336,
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chases would not violate rule 10b-5 under the Cady, Roberts analysis
because the information is received from the acquiring company and
the stock traded is that of the Target Company.
There have been suggestions that this analysis is too timid in
not finding an antifraud violation in the warehousing of Target Company stock.u Two lines of analysis have been suggested. One line
argues that the acquiring corporation's market information is a valuable corporate asset which should not be used for any other person's
personal profit." It assumes that by sharing the information the acquiring corporation is deprived of this asset in connection with a
securities transaction and thus has an action under rule 10b-5 against
its directors and the warehousers. 7 This argument was made in a
derivative suit on behalf of an acquiring corporation which had sold
target company stock to an institutional investor at the market price,
shortly before the acquiring corporation announced a tender offer for
target stock at $17 above market price. 5 The court held that, since
both the institutional investor and the acquiring corporation knew of
the impending tender offer, no deception occurred. It recognized that
corporate management had the right to sell corporate assets in an
arms-length transaction for consideration (including help in effecting
the planned tender offer) which the board thought appropriate. If the
board bargained poorly, its judgment could be questioned under state
law doctrines of corporate waste and negligent mismanagement. 9 Indeed, it has been held that an acquiring corporation may enlst the
S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970).
5 See Thomas, Warehousing, 3 REv. SEc. R,:r. 975 (1970). In addition, Thomas
warns that there are a number of other legal problems which may be faced by those
engaging in warehousing, including whether the warehousers are "persons" under § 13(d)
(3) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (3) (1970). These problems are outlined in his
article. See also 5 IN sTITUTONAL INTM OR STDmY, supra note 49, at 2832-38; Wander,

supra note 43, at 243-45.
Target may also engage in warehousing. For example, Target may learn that Conglomerate plans a tender offer for its stock. It may seek to oppose the offer by persuading friendly institutions to buy Target stock. Target's ability to inform these institutions
poses different problems from Conglomerate's warehousing because Target has a traditional fiduciary duty toward the persons from whom its allies will be purchasing Target
stock. Similarly, if Conglomerate advises Target of its impending offer and secures Target's
support, Conglomerate may be more restricted than under our original hypothetical in its
ability to make market purchases of Target. Conglomerate may be viewed as having received inside information about a material fact, Targets management's support. Cf. note
45 supra.
56 Wander, supra note 43, at 241; see Kennedy, The Problem in Making a Bid for a
New Company, 25 Bus. LAw. 853, 856 (1970).
5See Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). The
10b-5 claim would be in addition to state law claims.
58
Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 300 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
59 Cf. id. at 735-36. That transaction has now been challenged under state law. Penn
Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349 (Del. Ch. 1972).
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aid of members of its board of directors by encouraging them to purchase Target Company stock in anticipation of an amalgamation between the two companies. 6 ° A fortiori Conglomerate should be able
to secure the help of the three pension funds with which it deals at
arms-length.
It has also been argued that warehousers violate rule lOb-5 by
purchasing Target Company stock without disclosing the market information-the impending tender offer-to sellers of Target Company
stock.6 In his article on warehousing, Eliot B. Thomas concluded
that:
[t]here would be a good deal of merit in a position that as
long as the potential acquiring company is acting by itself
in acquiring shares of a potential target company, it has no
duty to disclose its intention to others, but that once it elects
to make known its plans to others, neither they nor the acquiring company may make further purchases without disclosing the acquiring company's intentionsY2
Although Thomas does not state the reasons for his conclusions,
he seems worried about the fairness of enlarging opportunities to take
advantage of non-public, material information. Nevertheless, he does
not seem to rule out an acquiring company's enhancing its own capacity
to buy target company stock by borrowing money. Warehousing can
be viewed as an alternative to a bank loan, a public offering of securities, or a private placement as a means of raising the capital necessary to make a tender offer . 3 Banks frequently are unwilling to
finance tender offers without assurance that the target company's
revenues will be available as an additional source of funds to service
the debt and repay the loan.6 4 Warehousing, thus, may serve an interim financing until it is determined whether sufficient shares have
been tendered to give the acquiring company control of the target.
Warehousing permits potential acquiring companies who cannot se60
Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf. Bubolz v. Burke, 266
F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Mo. 1967). When the acquiring corporation seeks the assistance of
insiders, there is the danger that the call for help was instigated by the desire to benefit
the insiders. Arms-length transactions do not present this danger.
In the context of a merger proposal or exchange offer, a purchase of Target Company
stock by Conglomerate, its officers or allies could be a violation of rule 10b-6 under the

1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1972). See Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta

Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970); Wheat, Trading Activity in Exchange Offers: Some
Possible Pitfalls, in 2D ANNuAL INSTITUTE, supra note 43, at 289, 293.
61 Thomas, supra note 55, at 975.
62
Id. 977.
63 5 INSTITUTIONAL

INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 49, at 2828-29,

2836-37,

2848;

Sandier & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur, Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 Onxo
ST. L.J. 225, 254-55 n.149 (1969) (institutions are agents of the offeror and therefore
have no greater duty of disclosure than their principal).
64 5 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 49, at 2828.
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cure financing by conventional means to take advantage of their selfgenerated analysis that the target's stock may be underpriced.
More difficult questions are raised where Conglomerate's president secretly buys Target stock for his own account and not to further
Conglomerate's business purposes. His purchases normally would be
proscribed by state law and he would be liable to Conglomerate for
any profit which he made from the purchases. 6 Because the securities
transactions were an integral part of the president's breach of his
fiduciary duty to his corporation, he arguably has violated rule 10b-5
on the basis of the Supreme Court's broad reading of the rule in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers' Life & Casualty Co."6 The
president's purchases might possibly raise the price of Target Company stock, thereby increasing the cost of Conglomerate's market
purchases. His purchases could, therefore, be viewed as operating as
a fraud on Conglomerate in connection with its purchases of Target
Company stock. This, however, is not a problem of market information; it is a question of the extent to which rule 10b-5 embraces
violations of fiduciary duties in which securities transactions play a
part.
The market information issue is presented squarely by the question whether Target stockholders who sold their shares prior to the
announcement of Conglomerate's tender offer have a cause of action
against Conglomerate's president under rule 10b-5. A remedy is probably not available under state law, because he made no misrepresentations and has no fiduciary relationship to Target stockholders which
would require him to make affirmative disclosures 7 The same reasons would also argue against lOb-5 liability to sellers of Target
stock. That is, the president has no duty to disclose to them his market
information-the contemplated tender offer.
However, as indicated previously, there is a growing inclination
to extend the reach of the antifraud rules beyond the area encompassed by traditional corporate fiduciary concepts. The greatest extension would result from the position of those judges in Great American
Industries, who thought it might be appropriate to require that a
65 Cf., e.g., Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); Diamond
v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). Imposition of a
prophylactic rule makes it unnecessary to prove that the corporation sustained damages.
The court in Diamond suggested that officer's trading on non-public information about a
sharp earnings decline might harm the corporation's reputation of integrity, its image, its
stockholder relations and public regard for its securities generally. Id. at 499, 248 N.E.2d
at 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
66 404 U.S. 6 (1971) ; see New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.
N.Y. 1963).
67See, e.g., Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 246 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Fla. 1965), rev'd
208 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1967).
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seller in an arms-length transaction disclose the portion of the purchase price that would be paid to the finders. 8 Imposition of a duty
to disclose under those circumstances goes far in the direction of
requiring acceptance of the principle that parties to a transaction
must, under all circumstances, inform each other of all material facts
which they know or should know are not known by the other party
and are not publicly available. This principle significantly departs
from an underlying assumption of a competitive economy that it is
desirable, on the whole, to reward the diligent who have acquired a
superior market position.6 9 In terms of legal theory, this departure
embodies a dramatic stretching of present doctrine which imposes
disclosure obligations upon persons such as agents or trustees, who
expressly assume them, or upon persons whose role or relationship
to others, such as a seller of products or advice, permits an implication of certain responsibilities. The parity of information principle
would require no relationship whatsoever between the parties.
An inflexible principle requiring parity of material market information could be modified by requiring a balancing of this objective
' 70
with other policy goals. The SEC's reference to "trading fairness
might be viewed as embracing this type of alteration of the parity
principle. This fairness approach would permit the user of material,
non-public information to show that his exploitation of that information represented a legitimate reward for economic effort by him or
the person who provided him the information.
Analytically such a fairness approach reflects an attempt to balance at least two considerations which are central to the regulation
of securities markets. The securities laws seek to foster public investment by promoting confidence in the securities markets. Elimination
of disparities in information available to participants in the trading
markets has been an important part of the program to maintain public confidence. At the same time, the federal securities laws also seek
to enhance the efficiency of the securities markets as an allocator of
resources. Prompt disclosure is important to that aim. In addition,
68 See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra. In Birdman v. Electro-Catheter Corp.,
[Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 93,934 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 18, 1973), the district court
refused to enter summary judgment against a plaintiff alleging that a company violated
rule 10b-5 and § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), by failing to disclose the
potential market impact of the contemplated sale of restricted securities shortly after a
public offering by the issuer. Certain statements of the district court in Birdman come
close to adopting a parity of information theory. The district court stated: "The omission of such information, if material, would thwart the basic policy of Rule 10b-5 and
to a lesser extent, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 which is that all investors
have relatively equal access to material information." [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
at 93,725-26.
69
Fleischer
0

& Mundheim, supra note 46, at 331.
7 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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sufficient incentives must exist to encourage the digging out of information and careful and imaginative analyses of the available information.
This suggested version of the fairness approach would permit
Conglomerate to make market purchases prior to the announcement
of its tender offer. It would not prohibit the pension funds' purchases
or the purchases of any person whom Conglomerate intended should
personally benefit from advance knowledge of the proposed tender
offer. On the other hand, the interests being balanced under this
fairness approach probably would lead to the conclusion that the
president's trading, without the consent of Conglomerate, cannot be
justified. His trading lowers confidence in the fairness of the securities
markets; prohibition of his trading would not affect the incentives to
71
dig out information or analyze it.
Adoption of this concept of the fairness approach would,
however, create substantial difficulties. It imposes on the imprecise
standard of materiality the further imprecise test of whether, under
the particular circumstances, it is fair for the investor to trade on the
basis of the superior knowledge he possesses. This type of vague
guideline for appropriate conduct applicable to all participants in the
market, including investors, could place undesirable inhibitions on
investor trading. Moreover, the fairness approach easily blurs into
acceptance of a requirement of parity of information between participants in market transactions.
In any event, adoption of the fairness approach would represent
a significant departure from the assumptions underlying present regulation of market activities under rule 10b-5. The starting assumption
today is that market participants have a right to exploit informational
advantages. The antifraud concept embodied in rule 10b-5 limits that
right by identifying certain classes of persons who are barred from
using certain information for their own benefit. Basically these classes
are characterized by relationships to other persons or entities from
which it is reasonable to imply an expectation that a person will forego
informational advantages which others would be free to exploit. Such
restrictions have been consistently applied under rule 10b-5 to trading
by corporate management. 72
1

The fairness approach would require a person who has material non-public information to disclose it prior to trading in cases where he received the information for a
particular purpose but is using it for a different purpose. That limited extension of the
prohibitions on trading would not seem to deprive either the giver or the recipient of the
information of any legitimate reward for economic effort.
72
In an early 10b-S case, judge Leahy sought to explain the scope and purpose of
the rule:
The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a corporate insider
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In the course of their work these corporate insiders continuously
receive information important to an evaluation of their company's
stock. Common law notions developed in the special circumstances
doctrine have long indicated that it is inconsistent with their role for
corporate officials to use such information to benefit their trading in
the corporation's stock.73 Corporate officials receive specified compensation from the corporation and are expected not to augment that
compensation by taking advantage of shareholders or prospective
shareholders through market trading. 74 Further, compensating management by permitting it to trade on material, inside information
would, as Professor Schotland has described, create undue risk of
harm to the corporation and to the market. 75 Rule 10b-5 builds upon
the special circumstances doctrine and has gradually expanded the
group of persons who are viewed as corporate insiders and included
tippees of insiders as also subject to the trading prohibitions of rule
10b-5.7 6

The relationship of investment advisers to their clients and brokerdealers to their customers has also justified the imposition of trading
restrictions under antifraud rules. The implication of restrictions under
these circumstances is made easier by the existence of agency relationships which carry with them various common law obligations and by
the existence of special statutory sections. governing the conduct of
from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority
stockholders. It is an attempt to provide some degree of equalization of bargaining position in order that the minority may exercise an informed judgment in
any such transaction. Some courts have called this a fiduciary duty while others
state it is a duty imposed by the "special circumstances." One of the primary
purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . .was to outlaw the use of

inside information by corporate officers and principal stockholders for their own
financial advantage to the detriment of uninformed public security holders.
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951). This statement is
frequently echoed in current opinions. E.g., Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464
F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The essential purpose of Rule 10b-S as we have stated
time and again, is to prevent corporate insiders and their tippees from taking unfair
advantage of the uninformed outsiders.").
73 See 3 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1446-48. Tentative Draft No. 2 of the ALI's
Federal Securities Code crystallizes the "status" concept by taking the position that
directors and officers of a company may not trade on the basis of material, non-public
information about the corporation no matter what the source of that information. See
ALI FED. SEcuRITIEs CODE § 1303 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). Cf. 3D ANmxuAL INSTzTUTE,
supra note 6, at 394-97.
74

Professor Manne argues that the ability to trade on material, non-public corporate

information provides a necessary incentive to stimulate entrepreneurial activity within
the large, publicly held corporation. H. MAmNx, INsmER TRADnG AN TE STOCX MAgR=
138-41 (1966). Manne's views did not persuade many of his reviewers.
75 See Schotland, supra note 22, at 1448-52.
76 See 3 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1450-53; 6 id.at 3559-71. The extension of rule
10b-S restrictions to tippees of corporate insiders can best be justified on the theory that
they are participating in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty. See notes 31-35 supra
& accompanying text.
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these market professionals. 7 A conceptual basis for developing brokerdealer responsibilities to their customers (irrespective of whether the
broker-dealer acted as principal or agent in a particular transaction)
has been the shingle theory, which holds that by doing business with
the public a "broker-dealer impliedly represents that he will deal fairly
' 78
with his customers in accordance with the standards of the profession.
The content of these representations has been developed over time
through adjudication and rule making. The shingle theory does not
require that a securities firm act as a fiduciary in all dealings with its
customers or towards the marketplace. It normally imposes special
responsibilities when the firm has placed itself in a position of "trust
and confidence" with the customer and it is reasonable to assume a
significant degree of reliance by the customer on the firm, regardless
of whether the firm acts as agent or deals with the customer as dealer."
In addition, the emphasis in the shingle theory is on a duty to customers,
not to the marketplace.
Market information situations raise the question whether the
restrictions imposed under the antifraud rules as a consequence of
special relationships between persons (or identifiable entities) can be
extended to other groups because of their relationship to the functioning of the market. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 0 the
Supreme Court seemed to suggest that they could. In that case, two
employees of a bank, serving as transfer agent for a corporation holding assets of a group of mixed blood Ute Indians, sought to buy stock
in the corporation from its Indian shareholders at a price lower than
the price at which the stock was trading among non-Indians. The
Supreme Court stated that there would have been no duty to inform
the sellers that the stock was selling at a higher price in another
market if the bank acted merely as transfer agent for the stock.
771934 Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1970); Investment Advisers Act of 1940
§ 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970).
78 Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of
Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAw & CONIEMP. PnoB. 691, 702,
703 (1964).
70
"The shingle theory, with its implied representation of fairness to a customer,
automatically applies to a brokerage firm acting as a broker, and may apply when the
firm acts as a dealer, depending on the facts of the case." Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CoaRn.a L. Rnv. 869, 877 (1972).
See 3 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1482-93, 1500-08.
Under the shingle theory it is regarded as a fraud for a dealer to sell securities to
a customer at a price not reasonably related to the current market. See, e.g., SEC v.
Charles A. Morris & Associates, Inc., CCH Fr. SEC. L. REP. ff 93,756 (WMD. Tenn.
Feb. 1, 1973) ("The failure to inform the customers that the bonds were sold at prices
greatly in excess of the then current market prices constituted an omission to disclose a
material fact within the meaning of § 17(a) and Rule 10b-5.").
80406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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However, the Court found that the employees (and hence the bank)
functioned as "market makers" in the stock, encouraged the existence
of a separate market in the stock for non-Indians, and allowed the
mixed blood sellers to consider them "to be familiar with the market
for the shares of stock and rel[y] upon them when they desired to
sell their shares.""'- Under these circumstances, reliance by the sellers
created a duty to them.
The readiness of the Supreme Court in Ute to infer expectations
may perhaps be explained by the apparently unsophisticated nature of
the customers who were encouraged to rely on the bank. In this sense,
Ute may be interpreted as falling within the ambit of the trust and
confidence doctrine in which a non-professional has actively assumed
a professional market role. A similar result might occur where the
depositary in a tender offer uses information concerning the amount
of stock tendered to buy or sell stock of the target company. The
depositary, usually a bank, acts as agent for the acquiring company
by accepting tendered shares and, subject to the conditions of the
offer, holding them until the success of the offer has been determined.
Because the bank knows how many Target Company shares have been
tendered, it can assess both the likelihood that the offer will succeed
and whether shares that are tendered will be taken up in whole or in
part.12 This information gives the depositary bank trading advantages
over Target Company stockholders and arbitrageurs. For example, if
the minimum number of shares sought has been deposited irrevocably
and all shares tendered will be taken up, the depositary bank can
tender Target shares it holds and can purchase additional shares in
the market and tender them in riskless transactions.8 3 If the depositary
owns Target shares, it may use the information to sell the stock before
the failure of the offer becomes publicly apparent.84
81

1d. at 152-53.
An offeror typically will condition its obligation to purchase the shares tendered
upon the receipt of a specified minimum number of shares, reserving an option to take
up as many shares tendered over that minimum as the offeror desires. Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 46, at 336. Information about the likelihood that the tender offer will
succeed has been described as the most important information which target shareholders
need in order to determine whether or not to tender their shares. Henry, Activities of
Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers, 119 U. PA. L. Rav. 466 & n.3 (1971); see 2D ANUAL
IqsT TuTE, supra note 43, at 285-87; Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations,
21 RuTGEas L. Rav. 609, 615 n.15, 617-18 (1967); see generally 5 INsTIzrTioNAL INVSTOR
STUDY, supra note 49, at 2827-49.
831f the tendered shares are to be taken up pro rata, the calculations which determine whether the bank can trade profitably are different. See Henry, supra note 82, at
469.
84
This permits the bank to take advantage of the price increase caused by the
tender offer and to avoid having its shares immobilized until after the close of the offer,
at which time the price of Target stock may well have fallen.
The exchange specialist in the securities of Target Company also may be aware of
the likelihood of success of the tender offer as the result of trading activity in Target
82
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Although the depositary's use of the information it acquires about
the amount of Target shares tendered can benefit it or its clients, the
depositary's purchases or sales of Target stock will usually not harm
the maker of the tender offer. The tender offeror generally does not
care whose shares it buys pursuant to the offer. Moreover, it is foreclosed by rule 10b-13 from making any market purchases of Target
Company stock during the pendency of the offer. Thus, it might be
hard to argue that the depositary's market transactions operated as a
deceit on the offeror.
Nevertheless, it may be appropriate to bar the depositary from
using for its own purposes information it received as a result of the
special position in which it was placed by the offeror. Every person
tendering Target stock is forced to give that information to the depositary. It would be unfair to permit the depositary to use that information
to gain trading advantages over the class of investors who were forced
to supply it with the information 5
An SEC administrative opinion in a case disciplining a broker
may lend some support to this analysis. In that case,8" Blyth & Co.
allegedly obtained non-public information about the terms of new
government financings from an employee of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia, who had received the information from the Treasury
on a confidential basis. The terms of new offerings affect the market
price of existing government securities, particularly when the terms of
the new issues differ materially from those expected by government
bond traders and other persons interested in this segment of the
securities market. Blyth used this non-public market information to
effect transactions for its own account in outstanding government
securities. Note, The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule 10b-5, 42 N.Y.U.L.

REv. 695, 696, 708-10 (1967). In order to prevent the specialist from taking advantage
of this information, the American Stock Exchange provides that the specialist may tender
only that number of shares which he held at the time that the tender offer was announced, although in certain instances the Exchange may authorize the specialist to
tender a greater number of shares. ASE Rule 187(2) (a) (Commentary), 2 CCH Am.
STocK ExcH. GuiD 119327 (1965) [hereinafter cited as ASE GumE]. The foregoing
limitations apply only to the specialist's off-floor transactions and would not restrict his
use of such information in market trading, although the specialist presumably would be
bound by his obligation to trade only in order to maintain a "fair and orderly market."
See text accompanying notes 178-94 infra.
85 Compare this situation with an early SEC case, In re Herbert L. Honohan, 13
S.E.C. 754 (1943). In that case Honohan obtained non-public information about bids
submitted by bondholders in tenders for a bond sinking fund from an employee of the
corporate trustee admini tering the fund. On the basis of this information, Honohan purchased bonds in the market and tendered them at the highest price at which they would
be accepted. The SEC held that Honohan's sales of bonds to the sinking funds operated
as a fraud on other bondholders, presumably because their tenders were not accepted as
the result. The Honohan opinion did not consider the defendant's liability to persons
from whom he purchased the bonds.
8
ON re Blyth & Co., Inc., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8499 (Jan. 17, 1969), in
77,647.
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RaE.
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securities and the SEC held that by doing so Blyth violated rule 10b-5.
On its facts Blyth appears distinguishable from the depositary situation because Blyth received the market information from the "issuer"
of the securities in which transactions were effected. The depositary
receives its information about Target stock from sources other than
Target Company. However, the SEC opinion emphasizes Blyth's
knowledge that the information was non-public and the trading advantages accruing to Blyth as the result of that information. This emphasis
would be a basis for implying that Blyth would also have violated
rule 10b-5 if it had used the information to trade in corporate bonds
whose interest rates would be affected by the change in rates paid by
the government. The Treasury's position in the government bond
market may be viewed not only as an issuer, but as a primary factor,
through setting interest rates and maturities, in the trading market
itself. The SEC's opinion reflects a belief that the important market
information which the Treasury's special role yields may not be used
to secure private trading advantages.
Normally, public expectations that market participants will not
exploit informational advantages should be implied cautiously. The
concept of a duty to the market and extension of the prohibitions of
rule lob-5 to persons without any special relationship to the class of
persons sought to be protected can essentially rest only on the fairness
theory. We have identified certain problems with that concept.87 A
sensible application of the fairness approach requires in each instance
a careful examination of the role of the party whose actions are
complained of, the nature of the alleged wrongdoing, and the expectations of the aggrieved parties. The fairness approach seems to us
compatible with an antifraud concept in situations where there is a
clear showing of a course of dealing or holding out between the person
on whom the duty is imposed and the person to whom the duty is
owed so that an expectation of fair dealing between the two parties
is justified. In addition, it may be realistic to expect that a market
professional who is given a preferred position in order to fulfill a
particular market function will use any confidential information received as a consequence of his position solely to further his assigned
role. Further, responsibilities usually should be attached only to identifiable groups, such as brokers or dealers, whose activities can conveniently be policed by the regulatory and self-regulatory authorities.
Typically, such groups should be able to structure their compensation
in a fashion which permits them to pass on their compliance costs to
87 See

notes 67-72 supra & accompanying text.
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the protected class, and which makes it unnecessary for them to view
the confidential information that they acquire as a perquisite that can
be exploited for personal gain.
This view of where the law might properly move would not result
in creating any remedies in favor of Target sellers for the president's
breach of a duty to Conglomerate. The president is not a member of an
identifiable class of market professionals who play a key market role.
He has not engaged in any course of dealing with sellers of Target
stock that would justify an expectation of fair dealing between them.
On the other hand, as we have noted, a person's role or function
may give rise to this expectation. In United States v. Peltz,88 an attorney was indicted for conspiring with an employee of the SEC to
sell Georgia Pacific stock on the basis of confidential information with
respect to proposed SEC litigation against Georgia Pacific. Although
two counts of the indictment were based on violations of rule 10b-5,
they related to the attorney's false statement that his sales were long
rather than short. The complaint did not contain any count alleging a
10b-5 violation for trading on material nonpublic information. However,
the defendant's use of information supplied by an SEC employee was
held to violate a special federal statute making it a felony to conspire
"to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner
or for any purpose ...."I' This statute views the fraud to be on the
United States or on the SEC 90 Thus, it is similar in concept to the
theory that a corporate insider violates a duty to the corporation when
he uses for his own benefit information received in his corporate
capacity.'
Although the defendant's trading on confidential information
obtained from SEC sources was not charged as a rule 10b-5 violation,
a basis for doing so may exist. The SEC's regulatory activities give
it an intimate relationship to the functioning of the securities markets.
As part of its regulatory activities the SEC receives a continuous flow
of material nonpublic information. It is reasonable to expect that such
88 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970).
8918 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). 1934 Act § 24(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78x(c), makes it unlawful
for an SEC employee to use for personal benefit any information contained in any

application, report or document filed with the Commission which has been granted contreatment. This prohibition was apparently not applicable to the facts of Peltz.
fidential
90 The court pointed out that this statute would also prohibit the use for personal

trading of confidential information received from other federal agencies. In addition, it
noted that the statute would proscribe an arrangement with a judge's clerk to secure

confidential information with respect to a decision having implications for the stock
market.
433 F.2d at 52 n.4.
91
See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910

(1969).

824

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:798

information will not be used for the personal advantage of persons
92 In this sense the position of SEC
who are given preferred access to it.
employees and their tippees is analogous to the position of the Treasury
officials and their tippees discussed in the Blyth caseY3
III.

Drscr.osUR

OF INVESTMENT ADVICE

This section focuses principally on the responsibilities of the
market professional who generates market information. The market
information on which we will concentrate is the written research
report, market letter or technical analysis which results in specific
recommendations to buy or sell one or more securities. For our purposes we assume that the report, letter or analysis represents a perceptive analysis of publicly available facts. Thus, there would be no
prohibition against acting on the recommendations made. However,
the issuance of the recommendation itself may trigger a price impact,
because the report, letter or analysis has a wide following or the stock
has a thin market.9 4 Knowledge that the recommendation will be
issued shortly is therefore material market information. Anyone in
possession of such information can profit by buying (if the recommendation will be favorable) before issuance and selling shortly
thereafter.
A. Sources of tke Duty to Disclose
The Supreme Court has considered the legality of a pattern of
conduct of a subscription adviser who "[purchased] shares of a security for his own account shortly before recommending that security for
long-term investment and then immediately [sold] the shares at a
profit upon the rise in the market price following the recommendation."95 The Court held that the adviser's failure to disclose this practice (called scalping) operated as a fraud or deceit upon its clients or
prospective clients within the meaning of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940. The Court reasoned that an adviser who trades on the
market effect of his recommendation might be motivated to recommend those securities which would be most susceptible to scalping.
The practice thus affects the disinterestedness of the advice. At the
very least "an investor seeking the advice of a registered investment
92

The SEC's rules of conduct for its own employees embody that expectation.
93 See text accompanying note 86 supra.
94
See, e.g., SPEciAL STUDy,supra note 26, pt. 3, at 73-76; Ferber, Short-Run Effects of
Stock Market Services on Stock Prices, 13 J. Fnw. 83 (1958); Note, Stock Scalping By
the Investment Adviser: Fraud or Legitimate Business Practice?, 51 CAr. L. REV. 232,
233-35 (1963).
95 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181 (1963).

19731

TRADING ON MARKET INFORMATION

adviser must, if the legislative purpose is to be served, be permitted
to evaluate such overlapping motivations, through appropriate disclosure .... 1191
Buying or selling a security in advance of a recommendation,
without scalping, may itself be improper. The SEC considered that
problem in Kidder, Peabody & Co. 97 In that case the manager of
Kidder, Peabody's Special Investment Advisory Service allegedly"5
purchased and sold securities for his own account and accounts of his
relatives shortly before executing purchase or sale orders for clients of
the Special Service at less favorable prices. There was no allegation
that the manager or his relatives sold the stock on the price rise resulting from the purchases of the other clients of the Service. The Commission held that the registrant violated the antifraud provisions of
the Investment Advisers Act and the Securities Exchange Act, 99 because the manager did not disclose the preferred treatment given to
his own and his relatives' accounts. The SEC's opinion focused on the
attempt by the Investment Advisers Act to eliminate conflicts of
interest between the adviser and his clients. By holding itself out as
an investment adviser to these clients, Kidder, Peabody encouraged
them to believe that they were purchasing a disinterested serviceboth with respect to investment advice and the execution of transactions.0 The clients were entitled, at a minimum, to a clear warning
of any departure from this standard. 01
961d. at 196.
97
In re Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8426 (Oct. 16,
1968), in [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 77,618.
98
Although Kidder, Peabody denied the allegations in the SEC complaint, it agreed
to a stipulation of facts solely for the purpose of facilitating an Order of Settlement.
9
9Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970); 1934 Act
§§ 10(b), 15(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c) (1970); rules 10b-5, 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.1ob-5, 240.15cl-2 (1972).
10o Kidder, Peabody & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8426 (Oct. 16, 1968), in
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. EP. ff 77,618 at 83,324. Investment
of its own money or the money of its favored clients in a recommended stock could be
viewed as demonstrating the good faith belief of the adviser in the recommendation. Indeed, the Special Study found that investment ideas generated by research departments
in brokerage firms frequently were used to invest for the firm account or the accounts
of individual firm members. SpEcrAL STUDY, supra note 26, pt. 3, at 245-48. On the other
hand, pre-recommendation purchases create the risk of scalping and may affect the disinterestedness of the advice offered. See Howard & Perlman, SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 8970 (Aug. 31, 1971), in 2 CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. ff 22,781.30 (analyst held to
violate rule 10b-5 in making a buy recommendation to his firm without disclosing his
purchases
of the security recommended).
1 01
The prohibitions on investment adviser trading are supplemented by requirements
that partners, officers and directors of the investment adviser and employees involved
in the making or communicating of recommendations file quarterly reports with respect
to all of their securities transactions. SEC Investment Adv. Act Rule 204-2(12), 17
C.F.R. § 275.204-2(12) (1972). In addition to the reports required by rule 204-2(12),
many investment advisory complexes enforce policies restricting officer and employee
trading by requiring all officers and employees to execute personal securities transactions
through an affiliated broker. See, e.g., SEC, PUBLIC POLICY ImPLiCATIOmS Or INVTmENT
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The SEC has recently proposed extending the Kidder, Peabody
doctrine, in the case of persons affiliated with investment companies,
to bar pre-recommendation purchases. In its Public Policy Implications
of Investment Company Growth report, the SEC expressed concern
about purchases and sales of securities by persons associated with an
investment company on the basis of their knowledge of the company's
projected portfolio transactions."' 2 Advance knowledge of recommendations made or to be made by an investment adviser to its investment
company clients would present an opportunity for profiting on in and
out trading. In addition, purchasing or selling ahead of the investment
company might adversely affect the price to the investment company
of securities bought or sold.'0 3 Congress responded to the SEC's concerns by giving it power to enact rules prohibiting these trading
practices. 0 The SEC has proposed rule 17j-1' 05 under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 which would make it a fraudulent practice for
various persons affiliated with an investment company to buy or sell
or sale, or being
a security which is being considered for purchase
06
purchased or sold, by the investment company.
The concept of proscribing pre-recommendation transactions also
applies to brokerage firms. The New York and American Stock Exchanges prohibit member firm personnel with advance knowledge of
purchase or sale recommendations from taking action in contemplation
of the report, "such as making a transaction for their own account...
M
or passing on advance information.., to persons outside their firm. 07
Even after firm customers are informed of a recommendation, firm
personnel may not act "for accounts in which they have an interest,
ComPANY GRowTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 197 (1966); SPECIAL STUDY,
supra note 26, pt. 4, at 246.
102 SEC, PUBaIC PoLIcy ImPLICATIONS OF INVESTIET ComANY GROWTH, H.R.
REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 195-200 (1966).
103 The report also points out that an investment company may be harmed if it is
induced to manage its portfolio in a way which protects or strengthens the insider's

securities position.
1041nvestment Company Amendment Act of 1970 § 9(c), 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-17(j)
(1970).
105 38 Fed. Reg. 2180 (1973).
10 6 SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 7581 (Dec. 26, 1972), in [Current Devolopments] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 79,157. The release notes that the rule "proposes a
definite anti-fraud proscription against 'insider trading' by access persons with knowledge of the investment company's transactions." Id. 82,519. As one SEC staff member
stated: "Thus, there is no question that rules under Section 17(j) may cover transactions
based on extrinsic information about the portfolio company rather than intrinsic information about the company's earnings or prospects." Comments of Lewis J. Mendelson,
PLI, Tm SEC SPEAIcS 43 (1972).
OTNew York Stock Exchange, Member Firm Circular No. 170 (Nov. 16, 1962),
reprinted in New York Stock Exchange, Guidelines for Member Firm Communications
with the Public 5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NYSE Guidelines]; American Stock Exchange, Info. Circular No. 51-71 (Apr. 30, 1971) (barring pre-recommendation purchases).
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either in accordance with or contrary to the recommendation, until
the market effect of the recommendation is spent."1081
Capital Gains and Kidder, Peabody and the rules against prerecommendation trading are directed in substantial part at protecting
the professional quality of service rendered by persons offering investment advice. Although disclosure is the regulatory technique applied
by the cases, it would normally be so embarrassing or impractical to
make the required disclosures that, as a practical matter, in most instances scalping and sneaking to the head of the line can be viewed
as prohibited. 09 The absolute bar against pre-recommendation transactions contained in proposed rule 17j-1 and the Exchange rules
probably reflects a growing belief that disclosure cannot be adequately
made and, more importantly, that such transactions are incompatible
with professional conduct.
A recent SEC injunctive action appears to attack scalping as
creating harm to persons other than those to whom investment advice
is offered. In a complaint" 0 filed against the financial columnist of a
West Coast newspaper and his son, an editor of a financial journal,
the SEC alleged that the two engaged in scalping on the basis of favorable articles about certain companies which appeared in the father's
column and in the financial journal. The complaint first charged that
rule 10b-5 was violated because the defendants did not disclose in the
columns or otherwise that they had purchased shares in the companies
written up prior to the appearance of the columns and that they planned
to benefit from the anticipated price rise. This aspect of the complaint
tracks the theory of Capital Gains and applies it to a financial columnist, rather than to an investment adviser or broker. Even though a
financial columnist appears to be exempted from registration as an
investment adviser,"' a prohibition under the antifraud provisions of
108 NYSE Guidelines, supra note 107, at 5 (emphasis added).
10 See O'Boyle, Broker-Dealer Conflict of Interest Problems, in 3D ANrUA. INSTITTTE, supra note 6, at 457, 485-86.
110 SEC v. Campbell, Civ. No. 72-1684-WMD (CJD. Cal., July 24, 1972), in CCH
FFD. SEc. L. Re. ff 93,580. Campbell consented to a temporary injunction pending a
final decision in the action. LA. Times, Nov. 23, 1972, at 19, col. 2.
111 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a) (11), 15 U.S.C. § 806-2(a) (11)
(1970); 2 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1398; Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 214, 245 (1959). Loomis
states:
This exemption is presumably applicable also to syndicated columnists even
if technically they are independent contractors rather than employees of publishers. There is no comparable exemption for radio and television stations and
a question may therefore arise as to whether such stations, or producers or programs over them, may not fall within the definition of investment advisers if
they broadcast programs of investment advice. The fact that their compensation
comes from the sponsor rather than directly from the listeners is not necessarily
decisive.
Id. at 245 n.97.
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rule 1Ob-5 against his scalping on his own columns may be warranted."'
A financial columnist, like an investment adviser, develops a following
because of public confidence in the competence and objectivity of his
reporting. In addition, like a market professional, he receives preferred

access to information-in his case the information is given for the purpose of having it communicated to the public. Moreover, much of this
information is received from corporate sources and thus subject to

traditional rule 10b-5 coverage. A number of financial publications
appear to have recognized that the public expects financial columnists
and business writers to observe certain restraints in their investment
activities and have adopted internal standards of conduct governing
them." 8 Finally, section 17(b) of the 1933 Act, which in effect prohibits
the publication of any article about a company without fully disclosing

the receipt of any consideration for the publication of the article,
provides a helpful analogy." 4

The second allegation in the Campbell complaint appears to break
new ground. The SEC charged that the defendants violated rule 10b-5
by making market purchases of stocks of corporations shortly before
the appearance of the newspaper articles about the corporations without

disclosing to their sellers that a favorable story would soon appear.
Thus, the SEC is contending that the defendants' purchases of stock
112 Arguments that the policies which require disclosure by investment advisers
should also apply to journalists are discussed in Peskind, Regulation of the Financial
Press: A New Dimension to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, 14 ST. Lo is L.J. 80, 85-92
(1969) (A financial writer "impliedly warrants that the article is written from a disinterested perspective and that the author intends to gain nothing more from the article
than his fee or salary for writing it." Id. 91.); see Leavell, Investment Advice and the
Fraud Rules, 65 MicE. L. REv. 1569 (1967); Comment, The Regulation of Investment
Advice: Subscription Advisers and Fiduciary Duties, 63 McH. L. REv. 1220 (1965);
Note, Investment Advisers and Disclosure of an Intent to Trade, 71 YALE L.J. 1342
(1962); see generally SPEciAr STuny, supra note 26, pt. 3, at 65-102.
"13 See Livingston, Code of Ethics Needed for Financial Writers?, Philadelphia Inq.,
Aug. 27, 1972. at 17-c, col. 1 (describing the Wall Street Journal's policy statement to
its staff members). The Special Study found that the senior editor in charge of the
business news section of a major national magazine successfully engaged in scalping on
the basis of articles about companies which would be written up in the magazine. In
general, the companies written up were small and little known and the editor was able
to profit by short-term trading. Special Study, supra note 26, pt. 3, at 73-76. After the
employee was dismissed, the magazine distributed a statement of policy which provided
in part:
Profiting from special information.
-It has been a long standing point of policy that no employee of [the magazine]
should try to profit (by buying or selling securities or otherwise) from special
information that one of our magazines plans to carry a story or picture on a
company. In the very unusual case of a staff member who holds a significant interest in a company and who might be assigned on a story about that company,
his personal interest should be referred to the managing editor or his supervisor
in advance.
Id. at 76 n.130.
114 Section 17(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1970), by its terms only applies if the
consideration received comes from "an issuer, underwriter or dealer." In the financial
columnist case, the special consideration comes from the opportunity to scalp.
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at prices as yet unaffected by the demand to be generated from the
articles operated as a fraud or deceit on the sellers, not just on the
readers to whom the article was directed. This theory apparently shifts
emphasis from concern with providing impartial investment advice and
protecting the consumers of that advice to preventing the use of market
information to obtain an advantage over those to whom no special duties
were explicitly undertaken. The complaint reflects a view that under
these circumstances an honest and fair market compels a financial
columnist not to trade and that every buyer or seller affected by the
columnist's trading has a right of action against him.115
The attempt to fashion a widely available remedy may reflect an
SEC desire to enlist a larger group to police columnist conduct through
private actions. This attempt would try to find an analogy in the insider trading cases. An insider selling stock in the market on confidential corporate information may be liable to any person who bought
stock concurrently with or subsequent to the insider's sales and prior
to public disclosure of the confidential information." 6
There are, however, significant differences between the insider
trading case and the financial columnist case. Although the insider's
responsibilities flow from his relationship to the corporation, his obligation not to profit from confidential corporate information may be met
either by not trading or by disclosing the information to the market.
If he trades without disclosing the information, the insider harms sellers because they would not have completed the transaction had
the confidential information been generally available. 1 7 On the other
hand, the financial columnist's disclosure responsibilities should be
satisfied if the column itself discloses his intent to scalp. Under that
analysis, any sellers prior to publication would not be affected by the
disclosure. Sellers after publication of the column would obtain any
price benefits from the demand generated by the column.
From a pure policing point of view, the corporation in the insider
trading case provides the only alternative to buyers as a potential
private plaintiff. However, the corporation may not be a buyer during
the relevant period and, thus, may not have standing to sue under the
Birnbaum test."8 In addition, insiders may own a substantial amount
5
11 For a discussion of possible justifications for such a view, see text accompanying
notes 120-23 infra.
116 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] CCH FED.

Sxc. L. RP.

f1 93,714 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).

117 It has been argued that "since the seller would presumably have sold to another
buyer even if the insider had fulfilled his duty under the Act by not trading, it cannot
be said that the insider's violation of the Act damaged the seller." Note, 80 HARv. L. REV.
463, 475 (1966). The Court in Shapiro specifically rejected that argument. [Current]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., at 93,170-93.
118 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 343
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of the corporation's stock and may be able to recover, indirectly, some
of the squeezed out profit. Although adjustments in the amount of
recovery could be made to reflect the insider's interest in the corporation, these adjustments would frequently present complex problems.
On the other hand, the readers to whom the financial column is directed
would normally be sufficiently numerous and have adequate incentives
to sue to squeeze out any improper profits made by the columnist.
The weakness of the insider trading analogy suggests, therefore,
that the second allegation in the Campbell case is intended to go beyond
the creation.of a remedy, and asserts the existence of a general duty
to the market. 1 9 As we have previously indicated, the creation of a
duty to the market under these circumstances would stretch the concepts of rule lOb-5 to embrace a broad fairness approach.
This view of the Campbell complaint has potentially troubling
implications. Assume Over-the-Counter Retail Firm perceptively analyzes publicly available information about XYZ Corporation, a company
with a relatively small amount of common stock available for trading.
Retail Firm plans to recommend purchase of XYZ to its customers
in a research report which will be mailed to them. May Retail Firm
establish a position in XYZ prior to the publication of the report and
then sell the stock accumulated to its customers? Must Retail Firm
disclose to those persons who sell XYZ to it that it intends subsequently
to recommend XYZ?. 2 °
Retail Firm's purchases presumably will be made at prices lower
than sellers would get if they sold after the recommendation is published. In accord with the Campbell complaint, the sellers would argue
that Retail Firm had material, non-public market information (the
knowledge that it will shortly issue a recommendation) and that its
failure to disclose that information to the sellers operated as a fraud
or deceit on them. However, Retail Firm's practice, which is not uncommon, can be justified as a legitimate exploitation of its perceptive
U.S. 956 (1952). The doctrine is discussed in Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum
Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. R-v. 268 (1968). See also 6 L. Loss,
supra note 23, at 3613-45.
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969),
the only case in which a corporation was allowed to squeeze out profit earned as a consequence of trading on inside information, was decided on common law grounds. Counsel
for plaintiffs informed one of the authors that the Birnbaum problem prompted avoidance of a rule 10b-5 claim.
119 As we have indicated, note 106 supra, proposed SEC rule 17j-1 includes an antifraud proscription against insider trading by "access persons" of investment companies
who have knowledge of the companies' projected portfolio transactions. This rule could
be read as providing protection not only to the investment companies involved, but also
to all investors in the market. See Letter of Comment of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, Feb. 26, 1973 (relating to proposed rule 17j-1).
120 Retail Firm salesmen probably could not solicit customers to sell the stock to
Retail Firm at a time when it will shortly recommend the stock for purchase.

TRADING ON MARKET INFORMATION

analysis of XYZ. In addition, by careful assembly of an inventory of
XYZ which it makes available to its customers, Retail Firm may prevent a temporary imbalance of supply and demand which would cause
the price of XYZ to rise too rapidly, thus increasing the price which
must be paid by Retail Firm's customers.
Acceptance of the sellers' argument would not only prevent this
contribution to a more orderly market, but would force a dealer to
choose between capitalizing on his investment ideas either as an investor
or as a broker.12 1 Limitations on incentives to develop investment ideas
should only be imposed if it is necessary to avoid a harm which would
otherwise be created by the incentive. The basic risk in this case is
that Retail Firm's purchases will skew its investment judgment by
motivating it to recommend stocks which are susceptible to price rises
as a consequence of the recommendation. Even in the investment
adviser situation, the existence of this type of conflict of interest is
not prohibited. 22 Disclosure is considered the basic regulatory toolla
121 If the price of XYZ climbs too rapidly, XYZ may no longer be a reasonable
purchase. At that point Retail Firm cannot earn any commissions for putting its customers into an undervalued situation which it has discovered. It is interesting that
§ 206(3) of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (1970), explicitly provides that the prohibitions on acting as a principal in selling securities to a client do
not apply "to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or
dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transaction."
122Under § 206(3) of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (1970),
an investment adviser may sell securities to, or purchase securities from, a client if he
obtains the client's consent to the transaction after fully disclosing any adverse interest he
may have. In the view of the staff of the SEC, the disclosure should include the capacity
in which the adviser proposes to act; the cost to the adviser of any security which he
proposes to sell to his client; and the best price at which the transaction could be
effected by or for the client elsewhere if such price is more advantageous to the client
than the actual purchase or sale price. SEC Investment Adv. Act Release No. 1A-40
(Jan. 5, 1945), in 3 CCH FED. SEc. L. RP. ff 56,375.
12
3In Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971), a firm which
evaluated a customer's portfolio and strongly recommended sale of some of the customer's holdings and purchase of three stocks in which the firm was making a market
was held to have violated rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose its position as a market maker
of the recommended stocks. The court reasoned that the firm's investment judgment might
be tainted by its inventory position and that the customer "must be permitted to
evaluate overlapping motivations through appropriate disclosures, especially where one
motivation is economic self-interest." Id. at 1172.
Judge Friendly, joined by Chief Judge Lumbard and Judge Moore, wrote a strong
dissent to the refusal of the Second Circuit to hear the case en banc. Judge Friendly
argued that under the circumstances the imposition of a duty to make the disclosures
contemplated by the opinion could only be accomplished by administrative action with
prosective application. Cf. Batchelor v. Legg & Co., CCH Fan. Sac. L. REP. II 93,120
(D. Md. 1971) (market maker need not specifically indicate that it was acting as such
where it was not giving investment advice to customer).
One of the persistent questions under the antifraud rules is whether fraud can
ever exist where full disclosure is made to a person able to understand the information
communicated. Capital Gains and Kidder, Peabody were both decided on the ground
that adequate disclosure had not been made. Although the SEC staff recently has characterized certain transactions as "inherently fraudulent," see, e.g., Argus Securities Management Corporation, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 1178,366 (1971),
the SEC itself has been very cautious about taking such a position. See SEC, REPORT or
THE ADVSORY CoMMITTEE ON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT SaRVICES FOR I-nIVmUAL INVESTORS, Sm.r=, ACCOUNT INVESTMENT MANAGEENT SERVIcES 40-42 (1973).
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It would be peculiarly inappropriate to go beyond this approach in the
case of Retail Firm.
Dealers such as Retail Firm are generally recognized as subject to
conflicts of interest in rendering investment advice. Customers are
informed that they are dealing with the firm as principal. Moreover,
the compensation structure in the industry results in a broker-dealer
being compensated only if there is activity in a customer's account and
rewards him differently for the sale of different securities and for the
sale of the same securities in different situations. 2 4 Since the primary
regulatory technique for dealing with these conflicts of interest is disclosure, it would be necessary for Retail Firm to tell its customers
that it had purchased XYZ stock prior to releasing the recommendation.125 The SEC has been unwilling to deal more radically with existing
conflicts in the broker-dealer sector. It has rejected separating brokerdealer functions or, at the retail level, forcing a divorce between the
execution and advisory functions. 2 6 At the same time regulation by
disclosure has been supplemented through the imposition on brokerdealers of fiduciary responsibilities toward their customers, and by
limiting broker-dealers to recommendations which have a reasonable
basis and are suitable for the customers to whom the recommendations
are made.
Under these circumstances, sellers who sue Retail Firm must go
beyond even the fairness approach which is needed to support the
second allegation of the SEC's Campbell complaint and rely on the
principle of parity of information. We have previously indicated our
view that rule 10b-5 would not support application of this principle.
Even if it is clear that Retail Firm can purchase XYZ stock for
its own account prior to publication of its favorable recommendation,
124 For a discussion of compensation in the securities industry, see Ratner, Regulation2 5of the Compensation of Securities Dealers, 55 Copar L.Q. 348 (1970).
'
See O'Boyle, Broker-Dealer Conflict of Interest Problems, in 3D ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 457, 482; compare Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d
1167 (2d Cir. 1971), with SEC v. R.A. Holman & Co., 366 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1966).
O'Boyle suggests that, even though the purpose of such an inventory build-up may be
to enable the customer to obtain the security at a reasonable price, it would seem advisable to explain to customers what has actually been done, including possible disclosure of the price range and time period of the build-up. If the firm, on the other
hand, is liquidating an "investment" position or a position acquired as underwriter's
compensation, specific disclosure of these facts (and probably of the reasons for the
liquidation) should be made if the firm desires to recommend the security to its public
customers. O'Boyle also points out that a broker accumulating a block immediately before recommending the security to customers may have problems under 1934 Act Rule
10b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1972). See O'Boyle, Distributions and Rule 10b-6 Underwritings, in 2D ANNUAL INSTrrUTE, supra note 43, at 125, 129-31.
126See 2 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1215-18; 5 id. 3242 (segregation of brokerdealer functions); SEC Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets
(Feb. 2, 1972), in 137 BNA SEc. RFG. & L. REP'. pt. IT, at 6-7 (divorce between execution and advisory functions).
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somewhat different questions appear to be raised where Retail Firm
advises a select group of its customers to buy XYZ before a recommendation is released to the rest of Retail Firm's customers.127 That
practice was successfully attacked in Courtlandv. Walston & Co.' 28 In
that case the officer in charge of the investment advisory service of Walston & Co. followed a pattern of giving certain customers advance notice
of recommendations which would appear in a weekly market letter so
that those customers could establish positions in the recommended
stocks. The court assumed that the market letters contained honest,
reasonably based advice. The plaintiff in this case was one of the preferred customers who sued when the stocks she claimed she was induced
to buy by the grant of material market information depreciated in
value. The court held that the practice operated as a fraud upon the
plaintiff:
It had as its purpose, effective in the case of the plaintiff,
to induce the sale of securities which she owned, through
defendants, and the purchase of securities recommended by
defendants. This, of course, generated a trading volume, and
produced brokers' commissions beneficial both to the registered representatives advising plaintiff and to Walston. Use of
this device, without more, gives rise to liability, although it is
satisfactorily established that the securities recommended
were considered "good" recommendations, and that the sales
recommendations [were reasonably justified]."9
More importantly for our purposes, the court seemed to imply that
the practice of alerting certain customers to the stocks which would
be recommended also operated as a fraud on persons who sold the
stock without knowledge of the forthcoming letter. The court stated:
She [plaintiff] knew, or must be deemed to have known, that
if she received recommendations prior to the publication of
the market letter, and bought the stocks recommended, she
would be taking advantage of sellers who would be selling the
stocks without benefit of such special knowledge and who, if
the market letter pushed
up the stock, would be financial
08
losers to that extent'
The court's analysis seems to reflect views similar to those underlying the Campbell allegations that the financial columnist who scalped
127 If Retail Firm itself were prohibited from purchasing XYZ stock prior to publication of its recommendation, it would normally also be prohibited from alerting anyone
to its forthcoming recommendation. Any person purchasing stock on the basis of such a
tip would probably be considered a participant in Retail Firm's securities law violation.
128 340 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
129 Id. at 1082.
180 Id. at 1084 (emphasis added).

834

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:798

on his newspaper columns violated a duty of disclosure under rule
10b-5 to sellers of the stocks discussed.' 31 The court did not explain
why rule 10b-5 should be stretched to grant protection to the sellers.
The harm they suffer is no different from the harm which occurs whenever an investor sells stock shortly before the issuance of an influential
brokerage firm's buy recommendation.
Any analysis of the court's opinion must recognize that the court
did not directly address itself to the question of whether the broker
violated rule 10b-5 with respect to the sellers who sold before publication of the letter. The court seemed to be most concerned about the
broker's permitting customers to scalp his recommendations. The court
probably believed that sellers prior to the recommendation and purchasers after the recommendation should be given rights of action as
a way of helping police the broker's conduct 3 2 Indeed, the court permitted the customer who "intentionally" took advantage of the broker's
"scheme" to recover from the broker because of the salutary policing
effect. Moreover, the court's analysis is in large part directed to the
potential scalping problem inherent in advance tipping of market
letters. The court quoted at length from an SEC complaint 33 in which
an investment adviser followed a pattern of communicating recommendations to three classes of clients at three different times. The
adviser would first purchase the securities for discretionary accounts
and then sell the securities in the discretionary accounts while recommending them to the other clients. The court relied on Loss, Securities
Regulation, for support that the allegations in the complaint constituted
a manipulative or deceptive device. 3 4 It is interesting that Loss views
that complaint as illustrating the SEC's view that "an investment
adviser must avoid conflicts between himself and his clients or between
different classes of clients."' 3 5 He stresses fraud on clients, not on sellers.
The impact of the court's decision in Courtlandmay also be limited
because of the court's finding that an investment advisory relationship
existed between the plaintiff and Walston and that the defendants'
conduct violated the Investment Advisers Act. Viewed as an example
of a private action designed to help protect the quality of investment
advice, the case does not present much of an advance over Capital
Gains or Kidder, Peabody. Finally, the Courtland court stressed that
the market letter did not present analyses of companies but was written
1 31

See text accompanying notes 110-14 supra.

132 340 F. Supp. at 1089. See text accompanying notes 116-19 supra.
138 SEC v. Todd, Civil No. 6149 (D. Mass. 1946).
134 340 F. Supp. at 1084, citing 3 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1516.
135 3 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1516 (footnote omitted).
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from the point of view of a market analyst, "who discerned trends with
respect to the public favor or disfavor of securities in particular industries and of particular companies, and also the supply and demand of
securities."' 36 Such a letter is directed, in substantial part, toward
short-term trading and thus provides a strong inducement to favored
customers to take advantage of the short-term impact of the letter by
trading on its release. Indeed, the vice of the tipping practice in connection with this kind of market letter is that it gives a systematic
advantage to one group of the firm's customers at the expense of another
group of the firm's customers.
Despite these potential limits on the reach of the Courtland opinion, it is doubtful that a broker-dealer can exploit knowledge of a
forthcoming recommendation, whether technical or fundamental in
nature, by tipping certain customers to the fact it will shortly be issued.
It may well be assumed that, at least, certain customers will scalp on
the recommendation when it is made publicly available. With the
exception of the Retail Firm type of situation described earlier, a person
dispensing investment advice may not scalp, and may not pass along
the opportunity to favored customers. 137 Scalping has not been shown
to produce economic benefits or make the securities markets more
efficient; on the contrary, it raises questions relating to the quality of
the services being offered. It is perhaps for these reasons that the
information concerning a recomNYSE prohibits passing on advance
38
customers
favored
to
mendation
B.

Availability of Recommendations

Prohibiting investment advisers and broker-dealers from tipping
favored customers to the existence of a forthcoming recommendation
does not necessarily mean that investment advisers and broker-dealers
violate the antifraud rules or self-regulatory guidelines because their
research recommendations are not simultaneously made available to all
their clients. Their clients vary greatly: discretionary accounts; those
who purchase advice for a fee; large, active institutional accounts; less
active institutional accounts; smaller, public accounts with broad ranges
of activity.
When a firm decides to recommend a security, it usually cannot
do so in a way which permits all its customers an equal opportunity to
153

340 F. Supp. at 1084.
3 Irving Pollack, the Director of the SEC's Division of Securities Markets Enforcement advised "brokerfs] not [to] use any pattern of conduct or any course of
business which will provide somebody the opportunity to scalp him or to take advantage
of him." 3D ANmuAL IsrrurE, supra note 6, at 313.
138 See note 107 supra & accompanying text.
1 7
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react to the recommendation. For a large firm it will be impossible to
make simultaneous telephone calls. Mail arrives, if at all, at different
and unpredictable times. Further, any rule requiring an equal opportunity to react could discriminate against discretionary accounts. Trading in these accounts would have to be delayed for an arbitrary period
which, as a practical matter, could commence only after some of the
firm's other clients had already reacted to the recommendation. Under
present NYSE guidelines, brokers are free to act for discretionary
accounts at the same time that customers generally learn of the recommendation. 3 9
A rule requiring dissemination in equivalent ways would, for most
firms, result in mail notification. Firms with only a limited number of
large clients would then obtain a competitive advantage by the practice
of notifying all their clients by telephone. Present practice may often
involve an attempt to communicate recommendations within the firm
and then to authorize simultaneous release to customers. Notification
of customers will occur in a number of different ways. Institutions and
other important clients who may be interested in the security are called
on the telephone and the recommendation and underlying report are
discussed with them. Many clients will be informed by mail. And some
clients may not be informed of the recommendation at all. 40
This procedure, which can operate to give effect to the relative
economic importance of various clients to particular registered representatives and to the firm, appears to accord generally with customer
expectations.' 41 There have been suggestions which encourage brokerdealers and investment advisers to describe to their customers the
process of information dissemination, including fairly specific under139 NYSE Guidelines, supra note 107, at 5; American Stock Exchange, Info. Circular
No. 51-71 (Apr. 30, 1971). At least one NYSE member firm states it gives its discretionary clients "the full, first benefit of the firm's research recommendations.' SANFoRD
C. BERsxNq & Co., PoricY AN PRocEDmsS MANUAL 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
BERNs=u].
140 Existing studies of practices in allocating advice among clients of brokers and
investment advisers suggest the absence of uniform standards. See SPECiAL STUDY, supra
note 26, pt. 1, at 373-74; 2 INSTrtUTIONAL INvEsTOR STUDY, supra note 49 at 348-55,
372-74. See also PLI, INsTITTIONAL INVESTORS IN A CHANGiNG Ecoxomy 14-17, 37-40,
223-26, 244-45, 333-34 (1970).
1 41
See Henderson, Conflicts of Interest for the Money Manager, in 3D ANNUAL
IwSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 293, 299, 306-14. But see Interview with Philip Loomis, Jr.,
Gen'l. Counsel, SEC, at the Fall Conference of the Financial Analysts Federation (1968)
(reprints available from the Financial Analysts Federation). For an example of the
allocation practices of one New York Stock Exchange firm, see BEaNsTE N, supra note
139. Cf. PLI, INsTrr IOAL INWVESTORS IN A CHANGING EcoNoxY 223-26 (1971) (remarks
of Peter Bernstein).
General customer expectations are irrelevant where specific representations about
a firm's policy have been made to the customer by the firm or its salesmen. Moreover,
general customer expectations do not remain constant. Statements by the regulatory or
self-regulatory authorities indicating the desirability of certain procedures might well
result in changed expectations.
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scoring of the lag time which certain categories of customer can
expect. 1" Such descriptions should be helpful in meeting the claim that
a firm violated the antifraud rules by getting information to a particular
customer more slowly than to other customers.
This procedure for disseminating investment advice does not, in
our view, run afoul of the concerns manifested in Courtland, as long
as its purpose is not to afford customers an opportunity to scalp. We
recognize that a purpose test makes results in a specific case turn on
subtle factual distinctions. For example, if the broker-dealer tells the
customer only that a favorable research report will be issued, it is easy
to conclude that he intends the customer to act on market information.
A different presumption might attach where the customer receives the
research report. At the time that a customer is given a favorable
research report, the broker-dealer should be careful not to supply the
kind of information which would lead the customer to buy with the
expectation of selling out when the recommendation has produced a
surge of demand from other customers. In other words, the brokerdealer should not give information with respect to the timing or method
of any future dissemination of the report. However, making customers
aware of the firm's general allocation policy should not normally be
viewed as prohibited. Since the line between cases cannot be clearly
drawn, the broker-dealer should be alert to repeated short-swing trading by customers who normally receive research recommendations
early in the allocation process. Further, the broker-dealer should not
trade discretionary accounts in a manner which permits an inference
of scalping.
Our analysis suggests that in many situations an investment adviser
or broker-dealer can limit purchase recommendations to a select group
of customers. No case has yet suggested that a firm must communicate
its purchase recommendations to every client who might be interested.
Indeed, suitability concepts may make it inappropriate for a firm to
recommend certain securities to certain types of customers. We conclude only that, when a firm recommends securities, it must not communicate them in a way which facilitates scalping or defeats legitimate
customer expectations.
1
At the same time the SEC, in both administrative proceedings
14 2

See O'Boyle, Broker-DealerConflict of Interest Problems, in 3D ANNVAL INsTrruTE,
supra note 6, at 457, 486; Henderson, Conflicts of Interest for the Money Manager, in
id. 293, 305 (comments of P. Loomis). SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 7219 (June
9, 1972) proposes disclosure guidelines for mutual fund prospectuses which would include
a discussion of how the adviser allocates investment opportunities among clients. See also
Herman & Safanda, Allocating Investment Information, 29 Fix. ANAL. J., Jan./Feb.
1973, at 23.
143 Matter of Butcher & Sherrerd, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9402 (Nov. 24,
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and public statements 4 4 has warned that a firm's obligations to its customers may be broader where it changes its view of a security which
a customer has purchased or sold short on the firm's recommendation.
The SEC has stated that:
a broker is obliged to communicate any material changes in
his prior investment advice arising from subsequent research

he may do to all customers whom he knows have purchased
and may be holding shares on the basis of his earlier advice,
at least under circumstances where to do so would not impose
an unreasonable hardship on the broker. 4 5

The SEC's statement does not impose a duty to follow up securities
with respect to which a firm has made recommendations. 4 " A contrary

result would, in effect, turn each brokerage account into a managed
account. The SEC appears only to take the view that, if follow-up
research produces a material adverse change in the firm's view of a
security, that change in view should be communicated to the firm's

customers.
The requirement that a firm notify its customers of material
changes in its advice raises numerous practical questions. The SEC
recognized the need for flexibility in solving these questions by conditioning the duty to notify on its not creating "an unreasonable hardship" on the broker. A threshold question in dealing with this requirement is determining when a material change in investment advice has
occurred. In the Butcher & Sherrerd proceeding the firm, in effect,

changed a buy recommendation to a sell recommendation. A duty to
notify may, however, also be triggered where a buy recommendation
is changed to a hold recommendation. Customers seeking to buy more
of the stock through the firm in reliance on the previous advice should
be informed of the change in view. In addition, in those cases where a
1971); Summary of Order for Public Proceedings, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
SEc. L. REP. ff 78,466. This proceeding was settled. SEC Exchange Act Release No.
9894 (Dec. 11, 1972), [Current) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f1 79,135.
144 SEC, Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets (Feb. 2, 1972),
in 137 BNA SEc. REF. & L. RE. pt. II, at 6.
145 Id. This formulation retreats from an earlier, loosely constructed suggestion by
the Chairman of the SEC that:
A broker making research conclusions on a company available to any customer
will be called upon to make those conclusions known to all customers for whom
he has purchased shares on the basis of earlier research on that company.
See Henderson, Conflicts of Interest for the Money Manzger, in 3D ANNUAL INSTiTUTE,
supra note 6, at 309 n.25.
146 Several recent complaints appear to have charged, inter alia, that brokerage firms
violated the antifraud provisions by continuing to recommend the purchase of certain
stocks although the firms knew or should have known that the stocks were no longer
good investments. E.g., Mascolo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current]
CCH Fmn. SEc. L. REP. 1193,645 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1972); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill
& Co., 180 BNA SEc. RG. & L. REP. A-17 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 20, 1972).
FED.
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change to the hold category is understood to be a general sell signal,
the obligations relating to sell recommendations also apply. It is not
clear to what extent a true hold recommendation must be generally
communicated because by its terms it does not call for customer action.
A hold recommendation may simply indicate that a stock should be
held for long-term growth rather than purchased for short-term gains,
or that other available stocks offer more attractive investment opportunities. At the same time general circulation arguably is necessary
where there has been a very recent active solicitation by the firm to
buy the security or where customers otherwise reasonably believe that
the firm continues actively to recommend the securities. 4 7
Once a firm has changed its views on a particular stock, it must
determine who its customers are and which of its customers to notify.
Although it may be possible for a firm quickly to compile a list of all
of its customers who are recorded as holding that stock, the list would
probably include customers who did not purchase the stock in reliance
on the firm's earlier advice and might not include some customers who
did purchase it on reliance on the firm's earlier advice. For example,
a new customer of the firm may have bought the stock before he became
a customer. Many customers deal with a number of firms. Thus, some
customers may have bought the stock from another broker, but in reliance on the firm's advice. Further, customers who bought the stock
through the firm and took delivery of it may have sold the stock through
a different firm. Since notification is not without cost and since identification of persons who relied on the firm's advice may involve considerable difficulty, firms should be given substantial leeway to develop a
list of active customers who are readily identifiable from their records
as present holders of the security. 48 A good faith effort to avoid a
pattern of discrimination in favor of selected groups of persons should
be adequate.
In any event, when the firm makes a sell recommendation, it will
have to notify all registered representatives that buy orders in the
stock will be accepted only after the customer indicates that he under14 7
The SEC's articulation of the duty to notify seems to imply that it is only
triggered by a material change in the firm's recommendation. In those cases where salesmen use firm recommendations only as broad guidelines for their own recommendations,
they may be under a duty to communicate material changes in their individual views
with respect to securities which their customers have bought and are holding.
148 The difficulty of identifying customers still holding a stock which is the subject
of a sell recommendation has led one major brokerage firm to require, as a condition of
receiving sell recommendations on a particular security, that the shares be left with the
brokerage firm in "street name." The Bache Account Management Service transmits buy
and sell recommendations on approximately 300 stocks to every customer on a computerized list who holds that particular stock and who has left it with Bache in street
name. A letter is sent to each client on the list advising him of the recommendations and
the reasons for the change and suggesting that he contact his registered representative.
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stands that the firm recommends that the stock be sold. This procedure
will not necessarily alert the customer who learned of the firm's original
buy recommendation, but who is now buying stock through another
firm. However, it seems reasonable, under the circumstances, to limit
the firm's responsibilities to customers who are actively purchasing the
stock through it.
Once the appropriate list of customers is developed, the changed
recommendation must be communicated. In contrast to purchase recommendations where we have suggested that a broker can notify his more
important customers first, there are reasons for insisting that sell advice
be communicated to all customers at the same time. Normally sell
advice would have a more dramatic impact on market price than a
purchase recommendation. First, purchases are normally sought to
be made in a manner not to disrupt the market. On the other hand, sell
advice may result in decisions to liquidate a position as promptly as
practicable and reduce further anticipated losses. Second, purchase
advice is often for longer-term investment. That is, the recommendation
is usually not made for the quick term and may contemplate at least a
modest holding period. Thus, timing of the purchase may not be crucial.
On the other hand, sell advice is usually given with a view to prompt
action. For these reasons, it may be argued that customers' expectations
are for uniformity of treatment on the sell side 49
As suggested in our discussion of buy recommendations, it may be
impossible to design a system which will provide the changed views to
each customer at the same time. It should be sufficient that the firm
adopt a procedure reasonably designed to prevent discrimination in
favor of selected customers. That procedure probably requires some
policing of registered representatives to see that they are rotating the
order in which they notify their customers. 50

IV. DisCLOSUR.E

IN THE CONTEXT OF A CORPORATE
REPURCHASE PLAN

Another common situation involving self-generated, material, nonpublic market information is present when a corporation undertakes
a program of repurchasing its own shares. 51 Our discussion of this
problem will center around XYZ Corporation's funding of a stock
14 9
BEENSTEin, supra note 139, at 11, states that institutional customers are given
sell recommendations, but not buy recommendations, simultaneously with discretionary
accounts.
1502 IxsTiTUTIO7AL NvESToR STUDY, supra note 49, at 348-49. See Henderson,
Conflicts of Interest for the Money Managers, in 3D AiNttAL INsrurru, supra note 6,
at 293, 308-09 (remarks of Commissioner Loomis).
151 Corporate repurchase programs have grown relatively steadily since 1954. For a
comprehensive discussion of these programs see C. ErTs & A. YOUNG, THE REPurCH SE
OF CommozT STocx (1971). For an indication of recent corporate interest in repurchasing
stock, see Wall St. 3., Mar. 7, 1973, at 21, cols. 3-4; id., Nov. 22, 1972, at 1, col 6.
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option plan by purchasing its outstanding common stock, listed on
the New York Stock Exchange, in market transactions. The plan to
buy shares, rather than to issue new ones, is based on management's
view that XYZ stock is presently undervalued. The number of shares
to be repurchased will not be sufficient to cause a significant shrinkage in the capital base of the corporation. Thus, XYZ's earnings per
share will not be affected materially; and XYZ's debt to equity ratio
will not be materially changed. 52 XYZ has adequate cash reserves
for the repurchase program. It is expected that XYZ's repurchase
program will likely have a significant, albeit not precisely calculable,
impact on the market price of XYZ common stock. There is no other
material undisclosed information about XYZ.
It now appears settled that a corporation purchasing its own
stock must disclose any material, non-public information it possesses
about itself." For example, if XYZ discovers that land it owns contains valuable mineral deposits which can be commercially exploited,
it may not purchase its stock until disclosure with respect to that
discovery has been made. Failure to disclose would result in XYZ's
purchases allocating a portion of the increased value attributable to
the newly discovered mineral deposits from the shareholders who sell
their stock to those who do not. Although it is true that prior to public disclosure those who sell out may lose this increment in value to
strangers to the corporation or other shareholders who are equally
ignorant of the discovery, it seems particularly unfair to permit the
shift in value to occur within the corporation. The holders of a class
of securities assume that they will be exposed to identical risks of
loss and opportunities for gain and that management will not act in
a way which treats any particular group within the class preferentially. Those expectations should not be defeated by market activities
of the corporation.
In addition, management's judgment on the appropriate timing
of the disclosure of corporate events should not be subjected to pressure to buy stock for the corporation at as cheap a price as possible.
This pressure would be felt most severely in those cases where management itself owns a substantial amount of the corporation's stock
and would thus benefit from purchases made in the absence of dis54
closure. The first decision under rule lob-5 involved just such a case.!
152 If XYZ's earnings per share were significantly affected or its debt to equity
structure significantly changed, the repurchase program might be viewed as material
corporate information. Such information would probably have to be disclosed. See text
accompanying notes 193-54 infra.
15 5

See 3 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1453-94; 6 id. at 3971-72.
154 Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 SXE.C. 373 (1943). The corporate purchases in
all the early 1ob-S cases appear to have been motivated by insiders with large individual
holdings. 3 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1453.
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Management's inability to trade directly on inside information makes
it inappropriate to allow management to do so indirectly.
Since XYZ is obligated to disclose all material, non-public corporate information it possesses prior to funding its stock option plan
with market purchases, it becomes important to inquire whether management's judgment that XYZ stock is undervalued must be disclosed.
No case has so held.155 Disclosure of management's judgments about
the company's prospects appears to be required only when they crystallize into earnings per share estimates which deviate substantially
from the range of estimates circulating in the market. 15 Typically
management's estimate of per share earnings deviates substantially
from the estimates in the market only where management has become aware of some material facts, such as the loss of important
customer orders, which have not yet become generally available. However, there does not seem to be evidence showing that management
normally has superior ability to judge the validity of the capitalization ratio which the market places on earnings. 157 Thus, apart from
knowledge of unexpected earnings performance, management's judgment about the validity of current market value probably would not
be considered material' 5
Even if XYZ possesses no material, non-public corporate information, the literature suggests,' 59 and the practice appears to be,1 60
155 6 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 3584.

156 See Dayan, Correcting Errors In the Press, 5 R v.or SEc. REo. 941 (1972). See
also AwSEPICAN Socx EXCHANGE Con'Awy Gusn § 403(3) (May 20, 1970):
In the case of a rumor or report predicting future sales, earnings or other
data, no response from the company is ordinarily required. However, if such a
report is manifestly based on erroneous information, or is wrongly attributed
to a company source, the company should respond promptly to the supposedly
factual elements of the rumor or report in the same manner as to other false

rumors and reports of a supposedly factual nature. Moreover, if a rumor or report
contains a prediction that is clearly erroneous, the company should issue an
announcement to the effect that the company itself has made no such prediction

and currently knows of no facts that would justify making such prediction.
In its recent release announcing its intention to issue rules on projections, the SEC
suggested that the furnishing of forecasts to any outsider would be treated as "a
material event that requires the same full and immediate disclosure as other material
events .

. . ."

SEC Securities Act Release No. 5362 (Feb. 2, 1973). Public disclosure

would seem to be required whether or not the projection deviated in any way from
market expectations.

157 There is evidence that corporate insiders fare better in their trading than the
market as a whole. However, this advantage has been explained as reflecting their better
ability to judge internal corporate events rather than any greater acumen in judging the
market. See Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of Securities Markets, in
EcoNomTc PouicY AND =hE
RaouvIATiro or CoRoRATE Sacuarrias 185, 204 (H. Manne
ed. 1969). See also C. ELris & A. YouNG, supra note 151, at 149-50.
158If management's judgment of the validity of current market value were
material, management's own purchases and sales of company stock in effect would
have to be limited to programs outside management's control.
159 E.g., Harrison, Corporate Stock Repurchase Programs:SEC and Other Problems,
in 20 ANNuAL INsTiTUTE, supra note 43, at 211, 213-15 (1971).
160 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1972, at 49, cols. 7-8:
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that advance disclosure of the proposed repurchase program should be
made.' 61 In part these suggestions are premised on the view that the
program itself will have an impact on the market price of the stock
and that shareholders should be informed of it. 62 Shareholders would
then have an equal opportunity to share in the premium the corporation is prepared to pay to accomplish its repurchase program. Moreover, third persons encouraged to buy by the impact of the program
will be warned that the price action may be due to a temporary
phenomenon. 6 3 Further, management's decision to repurchase stock
has been characterized as a quiet way of paying (or increasing) a
dividend at a time when management is not certain that future operations will warrant the continuance of such dividend. It also indicates that management has no better alternative use for the cash
used to buy the stock. It has been argued that, by analogy to the
requirement for disclosing dividend action, management should be required to disclose this quasi-dividend action.'
These arguments for advance disclosure would be fully persuasive if advance disclosure did not increase the cost of accomplishing
the program. As long as there is no undisclosed corporate information
which would affect the market's assessment of XYZ stock, the price
The Buffalo Forge Company said it may purchase up to 50,000 shares of its
own common either on the open market or through private transactions.
The shares purchased will be used for employe [sic] stock options and future
acquisitions. The company's stock closed at 27-7/8, up 1/4 on the Big Board.
Directors of Granite Management Services, Inc., have authorized the purchase
of up to 100,000 common shares of the company on the open market. The
company's stock was up 1/4 at 5-5/8 on the American Stock Exchange.
16 1
AAinrcAN STOCK EXCHANGE COarPANY Gum § 403(1) (May 20, 1970) also
recommends disclosure of corporate repurchase programs. Further, § 23(c)(1) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-23(c)(1) (1970) conditions stock
repurchases by closed-end investment companies on notice of an intent to repurchase
having been given to shareholders within the six months preceding the purchases. See id.
Rule 23c-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.23c-1 (1972). On the other hand, in the case of non-closedend investment companies, the SEC has only required advance disclosure of a repurchase
program in the case of a company whose securities are the subject of a tender offer.
See 1934 Act Rule 13e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1972). Disclosure of a repurchase program is not required by proposed rule 13e-2, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,410 (1970), which deals
with repurchase
programs generally.
62
1 C. Erzus & A. YouNG, supra note 151, at 148-52, present reasons which, in their
judgment, seem to have convinced the academic and financial communities that a
corporate reacquisition program will have a favorable price impact on the security. They
conclude, however, that empirical evidence shows that stock repurchase programs
harbinger a drop in the stock price, both absolutely and relative to the market averages.
They caution that their results do not necessarily disprove the claim that the repurchase
program itself has a bolstering effect on a company suffering a general price decline. Id.
165-66.
163 If warning third persons imposes increased costs on the corporation, it is doubtful that the corporation would have an independent obligation to inform persons with
whom it has no dealings. The case seems analogous to the situation where, in the absence
of trading, a corporation has a good business reason for not disclosing material corporate
information.
6
1

4

See V. BRUDNFY & M. CHIRESTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALs ON CORPORAT

464 (1972).
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of XYZ prior to the repurchase program represents the market's best
estimate of the value of XYZ stock in comparison with alternative
investments (XYZ's equilibrium price). Any XYZ purchases at that
price treat holders and sellers of XYZ stock equally. Unlike the
change in equilibrium price caused by disclosure of corporate information, any price rise or retarding of a price decline attributable to
XYZ's purchase program and its advance disclosure probably will be
temporary. Absent disclosure of other material information, XYZ
stock should fall to its former equilibrium price upon completion of
the purchase program.
Nondisclosure of XYZ's purchase program may arguably result
in the fairest treatment of all the stockholders. The premium over
equilibrium price resulting from XYZ's market purchases will be distributed at random, among selling shareholders. Since the purchases
are made in the market, all shareholders have an equal opportunity
to sell their shares. Any increased cost of the repurchase program
attributable to its advance disclosure would benefit the selling shareholders and must be borne by the non-selling shareholders.
The argument against advance disclosure rests on the assumption that this disclosure would increase the cost of the repurchase
program. Wall Street wisdom assumes that in many cases announcing
the program will have an immediate and continuing impact in raising the price or retarding a decline, presumably because the market
is made aware of the presence of additional demand for the stock.'65
We have found no persuasive, empirical evidence exploring the validity of that assumption.
If advance disclosure increases the cost of the repurchase program,
the extra cost might nevertheless be justified if the premium attributable to advance disclosure were shared among a greater number of
shareholders. However, disclosure alone probably would not assure
such a result. Maximization of the number of shareholders participating
in the premium would be achieved if corporate repurchases were required to be made through a tender offer in which shares are accepted
on a pro rata basis.'6 6
165 Compare Fleck, Corporate Share Repurchasing: An Informal Discussion, 41
HAav. Bus. ScE. BuLL., Jan.-Feb., 1965, at 10, 12 (statement of Robert Vandell) and
Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1973, at 27, col. 6 (west coast ed.) (Analysts say "company's announced plan to repurchase its own shares tends to buoy the market price of those
shares,") with 43 HAxv. Bus. Rxv., May-June, 1965, at 36 (letter to the editor from
Edward G. Shufro, Partner, Shufro, Rose & Meyer):
(1) Surprising as it may seem, in practice as opposed to theory, the announcement of a repurchase program of even significant dimensions has very
little or no discernible effect on market price, as a rule, except for tenders well
above market.
Id. 38.
166
A suggestion along these lines has been made by Professor William L. Cary. See
Cary, Corporate Repurchases of Stock: State Law and Policy, in 2D AsNuAL INSTiTuTE,
supra note 43, at 225, 235.
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Failure to disclose corporate repurchase programs could also be
justified on the ground that the program will not have a substantial
impact on market price and, therefore, is not material. Ordinarily,
purchases are effected under guidelines proposed by the SEC to minimize price impacts. 1 7 Although these guidelines do not foreclose a
cumulative impact on market price,16 8 courts might be reluctant to
label as material a repurchase program conducted under the SEC's
proposed guidelines because market price is subject to many factors
and it is difficult to predict with any certainty the impact of carefully
placed purchases." 9
Management might determine that its stock can most efficiently
be acquired by a tender offer at a premium above market price. Even
if management decides to make a tender offer, it might seek to minimize total acquisition costs by purchasing stock in the market prior
to the announcement of the offer.' 70 However, this practice may be
subject to question. Unlike the market purchases previously considered, management has made a very specific judgment about the price
it is willing to pay for a substantial amount of securities. In this
respect the situation is similar to the crystallization of judgment involved in estimating earnings per share. Consequently, it may be
urged that this specific, management developed information about the
corporation should be used to benefit all shareholders equally. That
argument finds support in Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp.,""n in which
the court indicated that a corporation cannot discriminate among
members of a class of security holders by purchasing their securities
in the market shortly before redemption at a higher price."

V. DIscLosuRE BY PROFESSIONALS WITH AccEsS TO
MARKET INFORMATION

This final section of the article will examine certain of the restrictions on the activities of professionals that are assigned or take
167Proposed rule 13e-2, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,410 (1970).

168 In any event the corporation's purchases might act as a stabilizing influence or
eliminate the depressing influence of a block of stock overhanging the market.
169 For a discussion of materiality in the context of market information, see notes
20-22 supra & accompanying text.
1 70
See A. BRoRm, supra note 5, § 7.3(3), at 161; Note, Corporate Stock Repurchases Under the FederalSecurities Law, 66 CoLumr. L. REv. 1292, 1295 (1966).
171 249 Wisc. 205, 231-32, 23 N.W.2d 620, 632-33 (1946)
72

(dictum).

1 See Note, 59 Hsv. L. REv. 769, 777 (1946); Cf. Latty, Fairness-The Focal
Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. REv. 1, 16-17, 47 (1942).
A recent request for an exemption under rule 10b-13 suggests the depth of a
company's conviction that market purchases of its securities could only be made after
prior disclosure of a contemplated tender offer for them. See United Brands, avail.
Jan. 19, 1973. The company's disclosure of the impending offer for its convertible
debentures triggered the rule's prohibition against market purchases and thus made the
request for an exemption necessary. The staff refused to grant the exemption.
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specific roles in the trading market and as a consequence receive
special access to market information. In its recent release accompanying rule 19b-2, the SEC stated that its concern
for the fair and equal treatment of all investors has also lead
[sic] to a continuing analysis of exchange rules regulating
specialist trading, block positioning, floor trading and offfloor trading, since it is the center of the exchange marketplace
where the potential use and misuse of market information resulting from trading activity in a particular security is most
susceptible to exploitation.'
Restrictions on specialists and floor traders have been worked out
in detailed rules of the SEC and the self-regulatory organizations.
These restrictions, however, have not historically been grounded in
the antifraud provisions of the securities laws, but appear to have
been developed primarily under the SEC's broad powers under section 11 of the Exchange Act-measured by considerations of the "public interest" and the "protection of investors"' 4-or by the exchanges
under the broad authority to regulate the conduct of their members,
including the power to establish "just and equitable principles of
trade."' 7 5 These rules represent, in the broadest sense, an effort to

delineate the proper structural characteristics of a marketplace and
the role of its participants. Misuse of market information has been just
one consideration in their formulation.
A major set of unresolved questions in this field relates to the
extent to which restrictions similar to those governing the trading
activities of specialists and floor traders should be applied to other
market participants, such as over-the-counter market makers and
block positioners. As the movement toward a central marketplace accelerates, a reexamination of the need for comparable regulation will
also accelerate. Because market traders and block positioners are engaged in continuous activity requiring rapid decisionmaking and a
breach of standards can result in serious sanctions, any rules developed should be as specific as possible. In addition, these rules will
173 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9950, at 115-16 (Jan. 16, 1973).
174The SEC has specific power under § 11(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1970), to adopt rules regulating specialists' activities, and under § 11(a),
id. § 78k(a), to regulate floor trading by members of securities exchanges for their own
or discretionary accounts.
175Section 6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, id. § 78f(b), requires that the
rules of a registered exchange provide for the disciplining of a member for conduct
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. See also § 11(b), id. § 78k(b)
(rules governing specialists and odd-lot dealers), and § 19(b), id. § 78s(h) (various
subjects as to which it is contemplated that an exchange will exercise authority). See
STs
or Tm Suacomr. oN SECUaIrTEs, SENATE Coamm. ON BANKIG, Housmo ANn
URBAN AvrAils, 93n CONG., 1ST SESS., SEcunRus INDusTRY STunY 157-58 (1973).
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seek to achieve policy goals broader than simply barring the improper
exploitation of market information. For these reasons, we would expect that regulation will develop primarily through rulemaking, rather
than through efforts to apply rule 10b-5 to particular transactions.
This is not to say that rule 10b-5 would be inapplicable to a
market professional who utilizes information given to him for a particular purpose to disadvantage his customers. 6 Thus, a block trader
given a sell order to execute by a customer undoubtedly could not
sell ahead of his customer. 7 The preferred access to information
granted certain professionals could be a foundation for inferring certain expectations, at least on the part of investors dealing with those
professionals.
A.

Specialist Regulation

New York and American Stock Exchange specialists have what
is in effect an exclusive franchise to make the market on the exchange
in an assigned stock.""8 As a consequence of his position, the specialist sees the flow of orders in his stock 79 and often knows or can
176 A Note appropriately entitled The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule
lob-5, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 695 (1967) takes the position that the specialist is subject to
rule 10b-5 restrictions because of his special relationship to the corporation in whose stock
he specializes. However, the discussion in the Note centers primarily on material, nonpublic information about the corporation rather than information about the market in
its stock. It discloses no instance in which action under rule lob-5 has been taken against
a specialist who abused his privileged access to market information.
17 7 See Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); NYSE
Rule 92, 2 CCH N.Y. Srocx ExcH. GIDoE ff 2092 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NYSE
GUIDE] (a firm cannot execute an order for itself while it holds an unexecuted customer
order). Cf. Silverman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 331 F. Supp. 1334 (ED. Pa. 1971) (a firm
is under no duty to tell a customer that it is buying a security it also bought for the
customer).
178 For general descriptions of specialist activities, see G. LnrrER, Tim STOCK
MARKET 203-18 (3d ed. 1963); 2 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1201-08; 5 id. at 3206-25;
NEw YORK STOCK EXCIANGE, Now ABOUT THE SPEzA.IST (1969); S. ROBBINS, TIE
SECURITIES MARKETs-OPERATIONS AND ISSUES 191-201 (1966); B. SCHULTZ, THE SECURITms MARKET-AND How IT WORKS 124-52 (Rev. ed. A. Squier 1963); SPEcIAL STUDY,
supra note 26, pt. 2, at 57-171; Hearings on Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 1-216 (1972) (Case Study on Regulation
of Specialists on the New York and American Stock Exchanges) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Case Study]; Fiske, Can the Specialist System Cope With the Age of Block
Trading?, 3 T n INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug., 1969, at 29, reprinted in 2 SEC. L. REv.
559 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Fiske); Robertson, The Unreconstructed Specialists, 84
FORTUNE, Aug., 1971, at 183; Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist, 4 REv.
SEC. RFo. 897 (1971); Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist: An Economic
and Legal Analysis, 1970 DUKE L.J. 707 [hereinafter cited as Wolfson & Russo]; Note,
The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule 10b-5, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 695 (1967).
179 The growth of institutional trading and the emergence of competing markets
have resulted in the specialist in some stocks not seeing a significant portion of the flow
of orders for that stock. For example, an active third market dealer claims that in some
NYSE stocks it accounts for more than 100% of the NYSE volume. Advertisement by

Weeden & Co., Inc., 7 THE

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,

Jan., 1973, at 43. Similarly, specialists

may not be aware of block trades until the brokerage house handling the trade brings it
to the exchange floor for execution. Cf. 4 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SIUDY, supra note 49,
at 1599. The Study found that specialists' participation rate in block trades was greatest
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guess the identity of those presently interested in purchasing or selling stock. He also has exclusive access to the "book" of all orders
away from the current market price which other exchange members
have left with him for execution. 80 In addition to handling these
orders as a broker, the specialist acts as a dealer for his own account
in performing the statutorily dictated function of maintaining a fair
and orderly market. 8 ' The Special Study concluded that access to
the book gave the specialist "a definite trading advantage over other
market participants,"' because the book reflected public interest in
the security and in certain instances was an important indicator of
short-term price movement.1s83
The specialist is given these informational advantages so that he
may "assist in the maintenance, so far as practicable, of a fair and
orderly market. 1 8 4 Indeed, the specialist is broadly prohibited by
the Exchange Act from effecting transactions for his own account
for any other purpose. 8 5 Specific rules have been written to limit the
use the specialist may make of the superior information with which
he is supplied and to regulate his trading activities. For example, a
specialist normally must avoid participating as a dealer in opening
or reopening a stock in such a manner as to upset the public balance
of supply and demand. 6 One of the block positioning rules recently
adopted by the New York Stock Exchange states that, after a specialist has learned of a block transaction, he "should maintain the
same depth and normal variations between sales as he would had he
in block trades of less than $1 million, where assembly of participants is more directly related18to the floor. Id. at 1598.

oFor an example of a page from a specialist's book, see SPEcmL Sruoy, supra note

26, pt. 2, at 491.
181 1934 Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1970).
182 SpEaCrA STUDY, supra note 26, pt. 2, at 166.
1said. at 166; Wolfson & Russo, supra note 178, at 710.
184 1934 Act Rule lib-1(a) (2) (ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1(a) (2) (ii) (1972) ; accord,
NYSE Rule 104.10, 2 NYSE GUIDE f[2104.10 (1967); ASE Rule 170(b), 3 ASE GuiDE
9310 (1971).
185 1934 Act § 11(b) provides:
If under the rules and regulations of the Commission a specialist is permitted to act as a dealer, or is limited to acting as a dealer, such rules and
regulations shall restrict his dealings so far as practicable to those reasonably
necessary to permit him to maintain a fair and orderly market ....
15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1970).
18SNYSE Rules 104.10(g), 104.10(6), 104.11, 2 NYSE GUIDE 1111
2104.10, 2104.11
(1967); ASE Rules 170.01, 170.02, 170.04 (commentary), 2 ASE GumE ff 9310 (1969).
Those rules permit specialist participation if the condition of the general market or the
specialist's position in light of the reasonably anticipated needs of the market make his
participation advisable. See 2 NYSE GUIDE f1 2115A.20 (1965). The Special Study found
that specialists' control over the price of stock at openings is particularly significant.
SPEcIAL STUDy, supra note 26, pt. 2, at 137-42, 165, 168. Thus, it is important to prevent their judgment in opening a stock from being skewed by opportunities for personal
profit.
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not learned of the block.1 8 7 The specialist is limited in the manner
in which he can deal with the book: he is prohibited from "cleaning
up the book" 188 and in successive transactions with the book he must
give all orders the best price which any of them receive. 89 Other
rules limit the specialist in using his superior knowledge to compete
with public customers. Thus, if a specialist participates in a block of
stock at the "clean up" price, all executable public orders must also
receive the benefit of that price. 90 Still other restrictions prevent the
187NYSE Rule 127(a), 2 NYSE Gum, if 2127 (1972). The American Stock Exchange has not adopted special rules governing the conduct of block positioners.
In a magazine article published prior to the adoption of NYSE Rule 127, two
traders for a large mutual fund complex indicated how it would be possible for a
specialist to profit by moving the price of a security upon learning of a pending block
trade. The traders entered a small order for 700 shares of a very expensive stock when
the market price was $254 per share. After telephoning the order to a broker, one of
the traders saw some shares of the stock at $252, down $2. A few minutes later he saw
his own order cross the tape at $254, and shortly thereafter the stock was down to
$252 again. After checking with their broker, the traders confirmed that the specialist
had sold short to fill their order at $254 and then immediately covered his short sale at
$252, thereby earning a profit of $1400. Horror Stories, 108 Foasas, Sept. 15, 1971, at
43, 44.
188NYSE Rule 104.10(5)(B), 2 NYSE Gum ff 2104.10 (1967); ASE Rule
170.01(b) (commentary), 2 ASE GuiE if 9310 (1971). The NYSE rule provides in
pertinent part:
(5) ... The following types of transactions to establish or increase a position
are not to be effected except when they are reasonably necessary to render the
specialist's position adequate to [the needs of the market]:
(B) the purchase of all or substantially all the stock offered on the book
at a price equal to the last sale, when the stock so offered represents all or
substantially all the stock offered in the market; and when a substantial
amount of a stock is offered at a price equal to the last sale price the purchase
of more than 50% of all the stock offered;
Transactions of these types may, nevertheless, be effected with the approval
of a Floor Official or in less active markets where they are an essential part of
a proper course of dealings and where the amount of stock involved and the
price change, if any, are normal in relation to the market.
If the specialist were permitted to clean up the book, he would have greater control
over the market price of the security. For example, a specialist who was aware that a
block trade would shortly occur at a premium over the market price could purchase
all the stock offered on the book for his own account at the market price and resell
that stock at the premium in connection with the block trade. The specialist's participation in block transactions is presently limited to his reasonable needs in light of
his obligation to maintain a fair and orderly market following the block transaction.
See note 190 infra.
189NYSE Rule 104.10(8), 2 NYSE Gumo, if 2104.10 (1967); ASE Rule 155.02
(commentary), 2 ASE Gimn
if 9295 (1969). NYSE Rule 104.10(8) provides:
If a specialist has limit sell orders on his book at two or more different
prices, he should not, as a dealer, purchase all of the stock from the book at
the lowest limit price and then immediately purchase stock from the book
at a higher limit price. He should in such a situation withdraw the offer and
cross the entire amount of stock he is purchasing as a dealer at one price. The
same principle applies in the event the specialist sells stock to limit orders on the
book at two or more different prices.
NYSE Rule 91, 2 NYSE Gumo if 2091 (1972), and ASE Rule 152, 2 ASE GUm
if 9292 (1971), generally regulate members' principal transactions with their customers.
190NYSE Rules 104.10(7), 127, 2 NYSE GumE fff 2104.10 (1967), 2127 (1972);
ASE Rule 155.01 (commentary), 2 ASE Gum. if 9295 (1969). NYSE Rule 104.10(7) and
ASE Rule 155, known as the "gapping rules," were adopted as the result of a finding by
the Special Study that possible fiduciary problems were involved when the specialist
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specialist from letting other persons take advantage of his market
information. The effect of Section 11(b) of the Exchange Act is to
make it unlawful for a specialist to disclose the content of his book
unless he makes it available to all members of the exchange. That
section also permits a specialist, acting'as a broker, to execute only
market or limited price orders. 191 The premise is that a specialist
should not be able to use the special market information he receives
to exercise discretion withrespect to the timing or price of an execution.
The superior information to which the specialist is given access
is susceptible to abuse in favor of his own customers. Indeed, the
Special Study identified a number of instances in which specialists
had succumbed to the temptation to give preferential treatment to
their private customers. 92 As a consequence, the Study recommended
that specialists and their firms should not be permitted to have their
own retail customers. 3 However, the rule ultimately adopted only
participated in a block trade at a better price than he obtained for his customers on the
book. SPEcm STUDy, supra note 26, pt. 2, at 137. At the time of the Institutional
Investor Study, the NYSE gapping rule did not give the benefit of the clean-up price
to any book order at the current bid or offer, to stop orders, or if the specialist did not
discuss the block with the brokerage firm handling the trade prior to execution or did
not participate for his own account at the clean-up price. For a discussion of the problems
raised by the operation of the gapping rule in this manner, see 4 INsTrrUTroNAL INVESToI
STUDY, supra note 49, at 1604.05, and sources cited therein.
NYSE Rule 127, dealing with block positioning, has superseded the gapping rule.
Rule 127(b) provides that, prior to the execution of a block trade, the broker handling
the block trade shall ask the specialist to substitute his own quotation as a dealer for
one unit of trading at the current bid or offer in the stock, unless such current bid or
offer is on behalf of a Registered Trader, odd-lot dealer, or a member or member
organization known by the broker handling the order to be acting for his or its own
account. If this procedure is followed, book orders at the current bid or offer receive
the benefit of the discount or premium associated with the block trade. Rule 127(b)
also describes in detail procedures which the broker handling the trade may follow to
reduce the number of shares allocated to public orders.
ASE Rule 155.01 similarly provides that, if a block of stock is sold at the clean-up
price and the specialist purchases part of the block for his own account, he must
execute all executable buy orders on the book at the same price, except for the amount
of the block which can be executed at the current bid. Unlike the NYSE rule, however, ASE rule 155.01 provides that a block may be sold at different price limits on the
book. In that case the specialist should to the extent practicable buy round lots for his
own account at each price limit below the current bid and should divide his purchases
into round lots of approximately equal size among the price limits below the current
bid at which he participates.
19
1See NYSE Rules 123.20 (Supplementary Material), 123.44 (Supplementary
Material), 2 NYSE GumE 11[2123A.20, 2123A.44 (1972); ASE Rule 154, 2 ASE GUME
R 9294 (1969). The specialist also handles stop-loss orders which are a combination of
limited price and market orders. See 5 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 3207-08. A not held
order is an order in which the broker uses his discretion in the timing and price of
execution. See id. NYSE Rule 123.44 and ASE Rule 154.03 ban the specialist from accepting such orders. It has been stated that "[tlhe danger in these orders is that the great
discretion given to specialists would permit them to manipulate prices." Wolfson & Russo,
supra note 178, at 734 n.114.
192 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 26, pt. 2, at 159.
193 Id. 166.
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precludes the specialist from accepting orders in his specialty stocks
from certain corporate insiders and institutions. 9 4
B. Floor Traders
Exchange members who are able to execute transactions for their
own account on the floor of the exchange (floor traders) constitute
another group which is given a privileged position over other users
of the marketplace. Floor traders do not have to bear the normal exchange commission charge (even the costs of floor brokerage are
eliminated) and they have an opportunity to observe and act instantaneously on floor developments. 95 The Special Study observed that
"[o]nly some strong demonstrable, countervailing public benefit can
justify the special advantages enjoyed by the floor trader."'19 6 Since
the Special Study was not able to identify any particular market benefits from floor trading activities as they then existed, it recommended
the gradual abolition of floor trading. It also offered an alternative
under which an exchange plan might be developed to make floor
trading an auxiliary to the specialist's market making function. In
its 1964 proposal to restrict floor trading, the SEC characterized as
194 NYSE Rule 113, 2 NYSE GuzE I[ 2113 (1972). NYSE Rule 113(a) and ASE
Rule 190(b), 2 ASE Gumv ff 9330 (1971), prohibit the specialist from accepting an order
for the purchase or sale of any stock in which he is registered as a specialist directly (1)
from the company issuing such stock; (2) from any officer, director or 10% stockholder
of that company; (3) from any pension or profit-sharing fund; (4) from any institution,
such as a bank, trust company, insurance company, or investment company. The Commentary to ASE Rule 190 also prohibits a specialist from engaging in any solicitation for
the purpose of encouraging or discouraging the purchase or sale of specialty issues.
Two other sections of NYSE Rule 113 also deal with the Special Study's concern
that the specialist might give preference to his public customers. Rule 113(b) provides
that, with limited exceptions, an order given to a specialist for the purchase or sale of
a security in which he is registered as a specialist shall not indicate the account for which
the order is entered. Rule 113(c) and ASE Rules 190(c), (e) require the specialist to
report to the exchange such information as the exchange may require with respect to
transactions in stocks in which the specialist is registered for any account which is carried
by the specialist's member organization, is serviced by the specialist or his member organization or is introduced by him or his member organization to another member organization on a disclosed basis.
195The SEC has stated:
Commission studies make it dear that floor trading possesses special characteristics which result from floor traders' presence on the floor. From this strategic
position, trading activity may be observed minutes before it appears on the tape,
and bids or offers may be made or withdrawn in a matter of seconds. In addition, presence on the floor carries with it the benefit of what has been termed
the "feel of the market"-a heightened sense of market tenor and trend. This is
attributable, among other things, to the exchange of observations among floor
members, and familiarity with the trading techniques of specialists or floor brokers, with a resulting ability to foresee short-term market movements by informed observation of the activities of other persons on the floor.
This position has important consequences. Being first on the scene as a market movement commences, the floor trader can buy stock quicker and at a lower
price, or sell it quicker and at a higher price. This, of course, is done at the expense of some members of the public.
196 SPEcIAL S roy, supra note 26, pt. 2, at 240.
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fraudulent the use by floor traders of the market information to which

they had special access:
For example, a floor trader, familiar with the fact that certain commission brokers handle a large number of orders and

do not execute them all at once, can anticipate from their
appearance in the market that further substantial buying is
forthcoming; and, it is extremely doubtful whether trading
on this information, which is unavailable to the investing
public, is consistent with 'fair dealing' or with the 1antifraud
97
provisions of Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act.
The New York and American Stock Exchanges ultimately embraced the alternative and each filed a plan which sought to regulate
floor trader activity to prohibit destabilizing transactions and to make
such trading contribute to the orderliness of the market 9 8 Neither
the Special Study nor the SEC sought to impose special controls on

floor trading in dually listed stocks on regional stock exchanges. Access to the regional stock exchange floor did not appear to provide
special informational advantages. 99 However, the advent of the central market system has caused the SEC to reconsider its conclusions
about the advisability of permitting unrestricted floor trading on regional stock exchanges."'
C.

Other Exchange Members

Exchange members, other than registered floor traders and specialists, may also enjoy trading advantages not normally available to
the public. The Chairman of the SEC recently described those advantages in the following way:
The trading advantages which accrue to an exchange
member are considerable. He may trade for his own accounts
at the intra-member rate or without the payment of any
commission charge, enabling him to take advantage of minor
short swing price fluctuations by in and out trading ...
197SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7290 (Apr. 9, 1964), in [1961-1964 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 76,989, at 81,642-43.
198The exchange programs established capital requirements for floor traders, NYSE
Rule 111(b)(1), 2 NYSE GUIDE fT2111 (1969); ASE Rule 110(c), 2 ASE GUIDE 11 9260
(1969) ; segregated the functions of floor broker and floor trader during the same trading
session, NYSE Rule 112(b), 2 NYSE GUIDE ff 2112 (1972); ASE Rule 111(c), 2 ASE
GUmE I 9261 (1969); required the floor trader to yield to orders from off the floor,
NYSE Rule 112(c), 2 NYSE GUm V1[2112, 2112.24 (Supplementary Material) (1972);
ASE Rule 111(d), 2 ASE GUIDE IT9261 (1969); prohibited congregation and domination
in a particular stock, NYSE Rule 110, 2 NYSE GUIDE fiff 2110, 2110.10 (Supplementary
Material) (1969); ASE Rule 111(a), 2 ASE GUIDE IT9261 (1969); and required 7517
of the floor trader's transactions to be stabilizing, NYSE Rule 112(d), 2 NYSE GUIDE
IT2112 (1972); ASE Rule 111(e), 2 ASE GUmE IT9261 (1969).
199 SprcIA STUDY, suPra note 26, pt. 2, at 242.
2 00
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9950, at 128-29 n.393 (Jan. 16, 1973).
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Moreover, a member receives a constant input of trading information from the floor and from other members. He has
an intimate feel of trading conditions-for example, the size
and nature of volume-in the market as a whole and in particular securities. This knowledge, combined with an understanding of the ways in which market professionals such as
specialists and block positioners acquire and work off large
positions, enables the member to maximize profit on his trading decisions.
Perhaps even more importantly, the member can make
and implement trading decisions much more quickly than
members of the investing public because of his proximity to
information sources and, if present on the floor, his access to
the specialist's post.20 1
The direction of regulatory philosophy appears to be that exchange members should not be allowed to benefit from the advantages
conferred by their special status unless permitting them to do so, on
balance, strengthens the securities markets2 0 2 This philosophy is illustrated by exchange rules concerning member trading in connection
with the execution of block orders.
A block trade involves an order which is too large to be absorbed
in the ordinary course of the auction market.2 0 Its execution price is,
therefore, typically negotiated between the parties and often involves
a more than one percent discount from or premium over the current
market price. 0 4 In the case of block trades initiated by sellers, which
201 Address by SEC Chairman Casey, The Economic Club of New York, Mar. 8,
1972, in 143 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. G-1, G-3 (Mar. 15, 1972). There is disagreement
whether exchange members not present on the floor of an exchange enjoy informational
advantages over large institutional traders. For a position to the contrary, see Statement
of Donald M. Feuerstein, General Partner and Counsel, Salomon Brothers, at Hearings
on S. 470 and S. 488 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 7-9 (Feb. 21, 1973).
202 See text accompanying note 222 infra.
203 4 INSU0TIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 49, at 1537. See generally id. 153 7828. For purposes of Rules 97 and 127, the block positioning rules, the NYSE defines
a block as "a quantity of stock having market value of $200,000 or more which is
acquired by a member organization on its own behalf and/or for others from one or
more buyers or sellers in a single transaction." NYSE Rule 127.10 (Supplementary
Material), 2 NYSE GUIDE f 2127 (1972). The NYSE off-floor trading rule, which prohibits members from entering orders to take advantage of price changes caused by a
large block, applies whenever any of the persons enumerated in the rule learns about a
trade involving 5,000 shares or more. NYSE Rule 112.10(b) (Supplementary Material),
2 NYSE GuiiDE f 2112.10 (1972). ASE Rule 24, discussed at text accompanying notes
211-15 infra, applies to transactions involving 10,000 shares or more.
204 The price impacts of block trades on the NYSE are described in 4 INSTrUTIONAL
INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 49, at 1721-32. The Study found that in minus-tick block
trades (trades at a discount from the previous market price) of $1,000,000 and over the
average price change between the price at the close of the previous day and the block
price was a decline of 1.86%. That included a price decline, on the average, of 1.14%
from the price of the trade prior to the block trade to the block trade itself. The Study
found that following block trades prices rose on the average by 0.71% on the same day.
Id. 1728-29.
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constitute a substantial majority of block trades executed," 5 the price
change normally is temporary. The Institutional Investor Study concluded that in such block trades the discount from market price is
the temporary liquidity cost of moving a large quantity of stock
rather than a fundamental repricing of the security involved. 0 6 The
Study's analyses showed that on the average stock prices recovered
very quickly after block trades at a discount, returning to a level
very close to the former market price within the same day. 20 7 The

Study also described the way in which exchange members and particularly floor traders would be able to profit from their knowledge
of block trades prior to adoption of the present regulations. 8 Persons who knew that a block was being shopped could sell short at
the current market price and then cover their positions by participating in the block trade, either directly or by means of limit orders on
the book, or by making purchases near the discount price directly
following the block trade. 9 Conversely, persons who purchased shares
as part of the block trade or close to the discount price could profit
by selling those shares when the market price quickly rose. Although
such trading theoretically is possible by anyone with knowledge of a
substantial block trade, existing exchange commission rates would
usually make in and out trading by nonmembers unprofitable." Floor
traders in particular were able to engage in this practice-known as
chiseling-because their participation was not necessarily dependent
upon prior knowledge that a block trade would occur. Their position
on the floor enabled them to respond so quickly to news of a block
transaction that often they could purchase part of the block itself or
purchase at the discount before the announcement of the block trade
was printed on the tape.
Both major exchanges now prohibit such trading by members,
member firms, and their employees. 211 American Stock Exchange rule
24, which was adopted "to insure that members of the public have
an equal opportunity with Exchange members to make investments
205 Id. 1727.
2 6
0 Id. 1825; see generally id. 1721-818. The Study concluded that the premium paid

in plus-tick blocks, in which the buyer presumably was the active party, constituted a
repricing of the security involved rather than a liquidity cost.
fundamental
2
07 Id. 1728-32.
2
08 Id. 1732-35. The Special Study discussion of floor trading illustrates the possibility for similar trading advantages. See SPEciAL STUDY, supra note 26, pt. 2, at 208
et seq.

209 4 INsTUTIONAL Ivas~oR Sruny, supra note 49, at 1603-07.
2101d. 1729-30, 1732 n.207.
211 The events leading to the adoption of the two-minute rule and other prophylactic
rules are described in 5 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 3226-27.
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following the execution of block transactions on the Exchange,"2 1
provides:
After learning in any way about any trade in any security executed or about to be executed on the Floor of the
Exchange involving 10,000 shares or more, no member or
employee of a member or member organization may initiate
or transmit or cause to be transmitted to the Floor, for a period of two minutes following the print of such trade on the
ticker tape, an order in the same security for an account in
which any member or member organization or employee
thereof has an interest 13
The rule assumes that this market information will have been disseminated adequately within two minutes of its appearance on the
14
tape.
In certain stocks, presumably trades of less than 10,000 shares
may cause similar block trading price impacts. Although rule 24 could
be read as implying that any transaction not covered is permissible,
2 12

American Stock Exchange, Info. Circular No. 119-70, at 1 (Dec. 23, 1970).
Rule 24, 2 ASE Guma f1 9242B (1972). The comparable NYSE provision
is Rule 122.10, the supplementary material to restrictions on registered traders. Although
the NYSE provision applies only to off-floor orders, another provision adopted by the
Exchange at the same time requires, with certain exceptions, that all orders for the
account of a member or member firm, officers and employees of the firm, and discretionary accounts serviced by the member or member firm "be sent to the Floor through a
clearing firm's order room or other facilities regularly used for transmission of public
customers' orders to the Floor." NYSE Rule 112.10(a) (Supplementary Material), 2
NYSE Guma 12112.10 (1972). "The apparent purpose of [this provision] is to insure
that member firms trading for their own account do not get a time jump on the public
in their placement of orders." 5 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 3227. The Exchange also
requires members who are not registered traders and who execute orders for accounts
in which they have an interest after they have been on the Floor during the same day
to file a weekly report of such transactions. NYSE Rule 112.40(B) (Supplementary
Material), 2 NYSE Gum U 2112.40 (1969); 5 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 3227. By its
terms the NYSE two-minute rule is broader than ASE Rule 24, which does not prohibit the entry of orders for discretionary accounts during the prescribed period. However, entry of an order for a discretionary account upon learning of a block trade would
seem to conflict with the "ordinary course of business" language used in ASE Rule 24,
and entry of the order probably would violate the rule. As mentioned in text accompanying note 210 supra, the Institutional Investor Study found that on the average payment of exchange commissions would make non-member trading in connection with
block trades unprofitable.
214The restrictions of rule 24 do not apply to: (i) an order entered for the purpose of participating in the purchase or sale of the particular block about which the
member or employee has learned; (ii) a situation where a Floor Official expressly invites a member to participate in a difficult market situation; (iii) an order to reduce or
liquidate a position acquired pursuant to subparagraph (i) or (ii); (iv) a bona fide
arbitrage transaction or a transaction which is part of a purchase and sale or sale and
purchase of securities of companies involved in a publicly announced merger, acquisition,
tender offer, etc.; (v) a transaction to offset a transaction made in error. Exceptions (i)
and (ii) permit members to provide liquidity and thereby reduce the discount or premium accompanying the block trade.
Rule 24 has no analogue governing trading in the over-the-counter market. The
reason for that difference may lie in the fact that, in the absence of continuous reporting
of transactions, the sale of a block of stock in the over-the-counter market may not
have the adverse price impact on subsequent trades which exists in the exchange market.
213 ASE
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the wisdom of such a conclusion is unclear. On the one hand, in the
context of governing the action of professionals who are constantly
executing trades and who risk serious penalties if they guess wrong,
it is desirable for the regulators to draft fairly specific rules. This
policy would lead to the conclusion that rule 24 is exclusive. On the
other hand, rule 24 may properly be viewed as grounded on the notion that the development under the antifraud rules of principles of
equality of access to full and accurate corporate information has a
counterpart in the prohibition under the antifraud rules of conduct
by persons in the securities business which is not conducive to the
promotion of fair and honest markets 215
D. Block Positioners and Over-the-Counter Market Makers
In contrast to the detailed restrictions on trading by exchange
members outlined above, neither exchange nor NASD rules impose
comparable limitations upon use of market information by block positioners or over-the-counter market makers. 1 Over-the-counter market makers position securities from customers in the course of standing
ready on a continuous basis to buy or sell stock of a particular company at quoted prices. Registered block positioners 217 are exchange
member firms who facilitate specific customer transactions by taking
for the firm account any portion of a block which cannot be accounted
for through the firm's upstairs communications system or on the floor
of the exchange. Although block positioners normally act for sellers,
at times they also sell from their inventory or sell short in order to
complete a customer purchase order. In so doing they supplement
the specialist in offsetting temporary imbalances in supply and demand, and are exempted from the off-floor trading rules which we
have just discussed.2 18
215

Cf. SPEciAL STUDY, supra note 24, pt. 2, at 239-40. More than one exchange rule

may prohibit trading in connection with a block trade. An American Stock Exchange
circular distributed prior to the adoption of ASE Rule 24 stated that sanctions had been
taken against a member organization for excessive dealing in a listed security for the
member organization's trading account in violation of Exchange Rule 3(a). The Exchange
circular stated:
The member organization, following a large block transaction, purchased a
total of 10,000 shares of the security in four consecutive transactions at successively higher prices in a period of approximately one minute.
In taking this action, the [exchange] found that the member organization
and its partner who initiated these transactions had engaged in purchases which
were excessive in view of the market for the security. The 10,000 shares constituted substantially more activity than the normal volume for the security.
216 The functions of block positioners and market makers are compared in [Summary
volume] INsTTUTIoNAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 49, at 98-99; see generally 3 id. ch.

XII.

217 Block positioners are required by NYSE Rule 127, 2 NYSE GUIDE f 2127 (1972),
to register with the Exchange, and their activities are also governed by NYSE Rule 97,

2 NYSE GUIDE

ff

2097 (1972). There are no comparable American Stock Exchange rules.
112.10(b) (ii), 2 NYSE GUIm ff 2112.10 (1972); ASE Rule 24(b) (i),

218 NYSE Rule

1973]
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Over-the-counter market makers on a continuing basis, and block
positioners on a sporadic basis, receive confidential market information. For example, market makers learn non-public information about
the availability of significant supply or demand for a stock. This data
will affect the market maker's decision about the kind of market he
is willing to make.
There are no specific restrictions on market makers' or block
positioners' use of confidential market information to facilitate their
trading activities even though they are not required to assist in the
maintenance of a fair and orderly market. In part, this void undoubtedly recognizes that increased information reduces the risks of trading
and thus permits narrower markets to be made and better prices to
be offered. 19 In addition, neither the market maker nor the block
positioner is given a franchise which affords him an exclusive trading
position and an exclusive view of the total flow of the market. There
are competing market makers and block positioners. Movement into
a particular stock as a market maker is relatively unrestricted. If a
market maker or a block positioner acquires a reputation for abusing
the information he receives, business will likely flow to his competitors.
In addition, in a competitive environment, there is an incentive to make
220
the best market economically possible.
The increasing regulatory emphasis on promoting fairness finds
particular expression in efforts to police the operations of the rapidly
changing trading markets. The SEC's adoption in January, 1973 of
rule 19b-2, Concerning the Utilization of Membership on National
Securities Exchanges for Public Purposes,2 2 ' is part of a continuing
effort to offset the advantages of exchange membership against the
assumption of responsibilities to members of the investing public. In
1972 the SEC had sought legislation permitting it to regulate all exchange member off-floor trading because it believed that improved
communications gave exchange members the informational advantages
2 ASE Gumia ff 9242B (1972). See notes 211-15 supra & accompanying text. Members

who participate in a difficult market situation at the express invitation of a Floor Official

are similarly exempted from the off-floor trading rules. NYSE Rule 112.10(b)(i); ASE
Rule 24(b) (ii).
2 19
Although a market-maker must see all of the volume if it is to have the best
opportunity to distinguish between temporary and permanent imbalances, that
does not mean that it must participate in all the volume. Narrower bid-ask
spreads in a central market may well result from greater knowledge of the
market and competitive pressures, not from economies of scale.
Feuerstein, Toward A National System of Securities Exchanges, 28 Fim. ANAL. J., May/
June 1972, at 28, 34, reprinted in 4 SEc. L. RFv. 525, 533-34 (1972).
220 On certain problems of over-the-counter trading, particularly as related to the
NASDAQ system, see Bleakley, Is NASDAQ Really the Answer?, 5 THE INsTrroNAL
INVEsTOR, July, 1971, at 21, reprinted in 4 SEc. L. REv. 592 (1972).

221 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973).
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formerly available to floor traders. The legislation, which was not
adopted, would have authorized the SEC to regulate member trading
so that such trading would be required to make a "positive contribution"' to the operation of the market.2 Rule 19b-2 itself stemmed from
an expressed concern that certain users of the market by virtue of their
economic power may enjoy advantages over other investors. The rule
tries to limit that advantage by requiring all trades in the exchange
market to be filtered through a broker, the primary purpose of whose
2
membership is the conduct of a public securities business. 3
222
Letter from William J. Casey, SEC Chairman, to the Hon. Harrison A. Williams,
Jr., May 5, 1972.
.3This Article will not discuss the many questions which can be raised about the
efficacy of the rule in fulfilling this regulatory objective.

